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Abstract. Group encryption (GE) is the natural encryption analogue of
group signatures in that it allows verifiably encrypting messages for some
anonymous member of a group while providing evidence that the receiver
is a properly certified group member. Should the need arise, an opening
authority is capable of identifying the receiver of any ciphertext. As intro-
duced by Kiayias, Tsiounis and Yung (Asiacrypt’07), GE is motivated by
applications in the context of oblivious retriever storage systems, anony-
mous third parties and hierarchical group signatures. This paper provides
the first realization of group encryption under lattice assumptions. Our
construction is proved secure in the standard model (assuming interac-
tion in the proving phase) under the Learning-With-Errors (LWE) and
Short-Integer-Solution (SIS) assumptions. As a crucial component of our
system, we describe a new zero-knowledge argument system allowing to
demonstrate that a given ciphertext is a valid encryption under some hid-
den but certified public key, which incurs to prove quadratic statements
about LWE relations. Specifically, our protocol allows arguing knowledge
of witnesses consisting of X ∈ Zm×nq , s ∈ Znq and a small-norm e ∈ Zm
which underlie a public vector b = X · s + e ∈ Zmq while simultane-
ously proving that the matrix X ∈ Zm×nq has been correctly certified.
We believe our proof system to be useful in other applications involving
zero-knowledge proofs in the lattice setting.
Keywords. Lattices, zero-knowledge proofs, group encryption, anonymity.
1 Introduction
Since the pioneering work of Regev [50] and Gentry, Peikert and Vaikuntanathan
(GPV) [24], lattice-based cryptography has been an extremely active research
area. Not only do lattices enable powerful functionalities (e.g., [23,27]) that have
no viable realizations under discrete-logarithm or factoring-related assumptions,
they also offer a number of advantages over conventional number-theoretic tech-
niques, like simpler arithmetic operations, their conjectured resistance to quan-
tum attacks or a better asymptotic efficiency.
The design of numerous cryptographic protocols crucially relies on zero-
knowledge proofs [26] to prove properties about encrypted or committed values
so as to enforce honest behavior on behalf of participants or protect the privacy
of users. In the lattice settings, efficient zero-knowledge proofs are non-trivial
to construct due to the limited amount of algebraic structure. While natural
methods of proving knowledge of secret keys [45,43,32,41] are available, they are
only known to work for specific languages. When it comes to proving circuit sat-
isfiability, the best known methods are designed for the LPN setting [31] or take
advantage of the extra structure available in the ring LWE setting [55,10]. Hence,
these methods are not known to readily carry over to standard (i.e., non-ideal)
lattices. In the standard model, the problem is even trickier as we do not have a
lattice-based counterpart of Groth-Sahai proofs [29] and efficient non-interactive
proof systems are only available for specific problems [49].
The difficulty of designing efficient zero-knowledge proofs for lattice-related
languages makes it highly non-trivial to adapt privacy-preserving cryptographic
primitives in the lattice setting. In spite of these technical hurdles, a recent
body of work successfully designed anonymity-enabling mechanisms like ring
signatures [32,2], blind signatures [51], group signatures [28,36,37,9,46,42,39] or,
more recently, signature schemes with companion zero-knowledge protocols [38].
A common feature of all these works is that the zero-knowledge layer of the
proposed protocols only deals with linear equations, where witnesses are only
multiplied by public values.
In this paper, motivated by the design of advanced privacy-preserving proto-
cols in the lattice setting, we construct zero-knowledge arguments for non-linear
statements among witnesses consisting of vectors and matrices. For suitable pa-
rameters q, n,m ∈ Z, we consider zero-knowledge argument systems whereby a
prover can demonstrate knowledge of secret matrices X ∈ Zm×nq and vectors
s ∈ Znq , e ∈ Zm such that: (i) e ∈ Zm has small norm; (ii) A public vector
b ∈ Znq equals b = X · s + e mod q; (iii) The underlying pair (X, s) satisfies
additional algebraic relations: for instance, it should be possible to prove pos-
session of a signature on some representation of the matrix X. In particular,
our zero-knowledge argument makes it possible to prove that a given cipher-
text is a well-formed LWE-based encryption with respect to some hidden, but
certified public key. This protocol comes in handy in the design of group encryp-
tion schemes [34], where such languages naturally arise. In this paper, we thus
construct the first construction of group encryption under lattice assumptions.
Group Encryption. As suggested by Kiayias, Tsiounis and Yung [34], group
encryption (GE) is the encryption analogue of group signatures [19], which allow
users to anonymously sign messages on behalf of an entire group they belong
to. While group signatures aim at hiding the source of some message within
a crowd administered by some group manager, group encryption rather seeks
to hide its destination within a group of legitimate receivers. In both cases, a
verifier should be convinced that the anonymous signer/receiver indeed belongs
to a purported population. In order to keep users accountable for their actions,
an opening authority (OA) is further empowered with some information allowing
it to un-anonymize signatures/ciphertexts.
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Kiayias, Tsiounis and Yung [34] formalized GE schemes as a primitive allow-
ing the sender to generate publicly verifiable guarantees that: (1) The ciphertext
is well-formed and intended for some registered group member who will be able
to decrypt; (2) the opening authority will be able identify the receiver if nec-
essary; (3) The plaintext satisfies certain properties such as being a witness for
some public relation or the private key that underlies a given public key. In the
model of Kiayias et al. [34], the message secrecy and anonymity properties are
required to withstand active adversaries, which are granted access to decryption
oracles in all security experiments.
As a natural application, group encryption allows a firewall to filter all in-
coming encrypted emails except those intended for some certified organization
member and the content of which is additionally guaranteed to satisfy certain
requirements, like the absence of malware.
GE schemes are also motivated by natural privacy applications such as anony-
mous trusted third parties, key recovery mechanisms or oblivious retriever stor-
age systems. In optimistic protocols, GE allows verifiably encrypting messages
to anonymous trusted third parties which mostly remain off-line and only come
into play to sort out conflicts. In order to protect privacy-sensitive information
such as users’ citizenship, group encryption makes it possible to hide the identity
of users’ preferred trusted third parties within a set of properly certified trustees.
In cloud storage services, GE enables privacy-preserving asynchronous trans-
fers of encrypted datasets. Namely, it allows users to archive encrypted datasets
on remote servers while convincing those servers that the data is indeed in-
tended for some anonymous certified client who paid a subscription to the stor-
age provider. Moreover, a judge should be able to identify the archive’s recipient
in case a misbehaving server is found guilty of hosting suspicious transaction
records or any other illegal content.
As pointed out by Kiayias et al. [34], group encryption also implies a form of
hierarchical group signatures [54], where signatures can only be opened by a set
of eligible trustees operating in a very specific manner determiner by the signer.
Related work. Kiayias, Tsiounis and Yung (KTY) [34] formalized the no-
tion of group encryption and provided a modular design using zero-knowledge
proofs, digital signatures, anonymous CCA-secure public-key encryption and
commitment schemes. They also gave an efficient instantiation using Paillier’s
cryptosystem [47] and Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signatures [15].
Cathalo, Libert and Yung [18] designed a non-interactive system in the stan-
dard model under non-interactive pairing-related assumptions. El Aimani and
Joye [3] suggested various efficiency improvements with both interactive and
non-interactive proofs.
Libert et al. [40] empowered the GE primitive with a refined traceability
mechanism akin to that of traceable signatures [33]. Namely, by releasing a
user-specific trapdoor, the opening authority can allow anyone to publicly trace
ciphertexts encrypted for this specific group member without affecting the pri-
vacy of other users. Back in 2010, Izabache`ne, Pointcheval and Vergnaud [30]
considered the problem of eliminating subliminal channels in a different form of
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traceable group encryption.
As a matter of fact, all existing realizations of group encryption or similar
primitives rely on traditional number theoretic assumptions like the hardness of
factoring or computing discrete logarithms. In particular, all of them are vul-
nerable to quantum attacks. For the sake of not putting all one’s eggs in the
same basket, it is highly desirable to have instantiations based on alternative,
quantum-resistant foundations.
Our results and techniques. We put forth the first lattice-based realization
of the group encryption primitive and prove its security under the Learning-
With-Errors (LWE) [50] and Short-Integer-Solution (SIS) [4] assumptions. As in
the original design of Kiayias, Tsiounis and Yung [34], the security analysis of
our scheme stands in the standard model if we avail ourselves of interaction
between the prover and the verifier. In the random oracle model [8], the Fiat-
Shamir paradigm [22] readily provides a non-interactive solution based on the
same hardness assumptions.
As a core ingredient of our GE scheme, we develop a new technique allow-
ing to prove that a given ciphertext is a valid LWE-based encryption under
some hidden but certified public key. Via a novel extension of Stern-like zero-
knowledge arguments [53,32] in the lattice setting, we provide a method of prov-
ing quadratic relations between a secret certified matrix and a secret vector
occurring in LWE-related languages. We believe our zero-knowledge arguments
to be of independent interest as they find applications in other protocols involv-
ing zero-knowledge proofs in lattice-based cryptography.
It was shown by Kiayias et al. [34] that, in order to design a GE scheme,
three ingredients are necessary: we need digital signatures, anonymous (i.e., key-
private [7]) public-key encryption and zero-knowledge proofs. While the first two
ingredients are available in lattice-based cryptography, suitable zero-knowledge
proof systems are currently lacking. The underlying proof system should allow
the sender to prove that the ciphertext is well-formed and is decryptable by some
certified group member without betraying the latter’s identity. Such statements
typically involve equations of the form b = X · s + e mod q, for which given
integers n,m, q and vector b ∈ Zmq , the prover has to demonstrate possession of
a certified matrix X ∈ Zm×nq , vector s ∈ Znq and small-norm error vector e ∈ Zm
satisfying the equation. Existing mechanisms of proving relations appearing in
lattice-based cryptosystems belong to two main classes. The first one, which uses
“rejection sampling” techniques for Schnorr-like protocols [52], was introduced
by Lyubashevsky [43]. The second class, which was initiated by Ling et al. [41],
appeals to “decomposition-extension-permutation” techniques in lattice-based
extensions [32] of Stern’s protocol [53]. These techniques mainly deal with linear
equations, where each term is a product of a public matrix with a secret vec-
tor, which possibly satisfies some additional constraints (e.g., smallness) to be
proven. Here, we are presented with quadratic equations where some terms X · s
are products of two secret witnesses X ∈ Zm×nq and s ∈ Znq which are involved
in other equations. Proving such quadratic equations thus requires new ideas.
To overcome the above hurdle, we employ a divide-and-conquer strategy.
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First, we consider the binary representations of X and s, and view the product
X · s as a bunch of bit-wise products {xi · sj}i,j . Now, although these bit-wise
products still admit a quadratic nature, but to prove that each of them is well-
formed, it suffices to demonstrate in zero-knowledge that xi · sj belongs to the
set B = {0 · 0, 0 · 1, 1 · 0, 1 · 1} of cardinality 4. This can be done with a Stern-like
sub-protocol, using the following extending-then-permuting technique. We first
extend xi · sj to vector ext(xi, sj) def= (xi · sj , xi · sj , xi · sj , xi · sj)> ∈ {0, 1}4
whose entries are elements of B (here, c¯ denotes the bit 1− c). We then employ
a special permutation, determined by two random bits bx and bs, to the entries
of ext(xi, sj), such that the permuted vector is exactly the correct extension
ext(xi ⊕ bx, sj ⊕ bs), where ⊕ denotes the addition modulo 2. Seeing that a per-
mutation of ext(xi, sj) has entries in the set B, the verifier should be convinced
that xi ·sj ∈ B. Meanwhile, the bits bx and bs act as one-time pads that perfectly
hide xi and sj . Furthermore, to prove that the same bits xi and sj are involved in
other equations, we establish similar extending-then-permuting mechanisms for
their other appearances, and use the same one-time pads bx and bs, respectively,
as those places.
Having settled the problem of proving quadratic relations, we are able to
realize the desired zero-knowledge layer by combining our proof system with the
techniques of [42,38]. These help us demonstrate possession of a signature on
the user’s public key while proving that this key is encrypted under the OA’s
public key. Since users’ public keys consist of a matrix BU ∈ Zn×mq , we actually
encrypt a hash value of this matrix under the OA’s public key while the sender
proves knowledge of a signature on the binary decomposition of BU. By using a
suitable lattice-based hash function [25], the Stern-like protocols of [42,38] make
it possible to prove that the hashed matrix encrypted under the OA’s public key
coincides with the one for which the sender knows a certificate and which served
as a public key to encrypt the actual plaintext.
The last issue to sort out is to determine the appropriate encryption schemes
to work with in the two public-key encryption components. The CCA2-secure
cryptosystem implied by the Agrawal-Boneh-Boyen (ABB) identity-based en-
cryption (IBE) scheme [1] via the CHK transformation [16] is a natural choice
as it is one of the most efficient LWE-based candidates in the standard model.
For technical reasons, we chose to use a variant of the ABB cryptosystem based
on the trapdoor mechanism of Micciancio and Peikert [44] because it allows dis-
pensing with zero-knowledge proofs of public key validity. Indeed, the Kiayias-
Tsiounis-Yung model [34] mandates that certified public keys be valid public
keys (for which an underlying private key exists). This requirement is easier to
handle using Micciancio-Peikert trapdoors [44] since, unlike GPV trapdoors [24],
they are guaranteed to exist for any public matrix.
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2 Background and Definitions
2.1 Lattices
In our notations, all vectors are denoted in bold lower-case letters while bold
upper-case letters will be used for matrices. If b ∈ Rn, its Euclidean norm and
infinity norm will be denoted by ‖b‖ and ‖b‖∞ respectively. The Euclidean norm
of matrix B ∈ Rm×n with columns (bi)i≤n is denoted by ‖B‖ = maxi≤n ‖bi‖.
If B is full column-rank, we let B˜ denote its Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization.
When S is a finite set, we denote by U(S) the uniform distribution over S
and by x←↩ D the action of sampling x according to the distribution D.
A (full-rank) lattice L is the set of all integer linear combinations of some
linearly independent basis vectors (bi)i≤n belonging to some Rn. We work with
q-ary lattices, for some prime q.
Definition 1. Let m ≥ n ≥ 1, a prime q ≥ 2 and A ∈ Zn×mq and u ∈ Znq ,
define Λq(A) := {e ∈ Zm | ∃s ∈ Znq s.t. AT · s = e mod q} as well as
Λ⊥q (A) := {e ∈ Zm | A · e = 0n mod q},
Λuq (A) := {e ∈ Zm | A · e = u mod q}
For any t ∈ Λuq (A), Λuq (A) = Λ⊥q (A) + t so that Λuq (A) is a shift of Λ⊥q (A).
For a lattice L, a vector c ∈ Rn and a real σ > 0, define ρσ,c(x) = exp(−pi‖x−
c‖2/σ2). The discrete Gaussian distribution of support L, parameter σ and cen-
ter c is defined as DL,σ,c(y) = ρσ,c(y)/ρσ,c(L) for any y ∈ L. We denote by
DL,σ(y) the distribution centered in c = 0. We will extensively use the fact that
samples from DL,σ are short with overwhelming probability.
Lemma 1 ([6, Le. 1.5]). For any lattice L ⊆ Rn and positive real number σ >
0, we have Prb←↩DL,σ [‖b‖ ≤
√
nσ] ≥ 1− 2−Ω(n).
As shown in [24], Gaussian distributions with lattice support can be sampled
from efficiently, given a sufficiently short basis of the lattice.
Lemma 2 ([14, Le. 2.3]). There exists a PPT (probabilistic polynomial-time)
algorithm GPVSample that takes as inputs a basis B of a lattice L ⊆ Zn and a
rational σ ≥ ‖B˜‖ ·Ω(√log n), and outputs vectors b ∈ L with distribution DL,σ.
Lemma 3 ([5, Th. 3.2]). There exists a PPT algorithm TrapGen that takes
as inputs 1n, 1m and an integer q ≥ 2 with m ≥ Ω(n log q), and outputs a
matrix A ∈ Zn×mq and a basis TA of Λ⊥q (A) such that A is within statistical
distance 2−Ω(n) to U(Zn×mq ), and ‖T˜A‖ ≤ O(
√
n log q).
Lemma 3 is often combined with the sampler from Lemma 2. Micciancio and
Peikert [44] recently proposed a more efficient approach for this combined task,
which should be preferred in practice but, for the sake of simplicity, we present
our schemes using TrapGen.
We rely on a basis delegation algorithm [17] which extends a trapdoor for A ∈
Zn×mq into a trapdoor of any B ∈ Zn×m
′
q whose left n×m submatrix is A.
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Lemma 4 ([17, Le. 3.2]). There exists a PPT algorithm ExtBasis that takes
as inputs a matrix B ∈ Zn×m′q whose first m columns span Znq , and a basis TA
of Λ⊥q (A) where A is the left n × m submatrix of B, and outputs a basis TB
of Λ⊥q (B) with ‖T˜B‖ ≤ ‖T˜A‖.
Like [13,11], we use a technique due to Agrawal, Boneh and Boyen [1] that
realizes a punctured trapdoor mechanism [12]. Analogously to [44], we will use
such a mechanism in the real scheme and not only in the proof.
Lemma 5 ([1, Th. 19]). There exists a PPT algorithm SampleRight that takes
as inputs matrices A ∈ Zn×mq ,C ∈ Zn×m¯q , a low-norm matrix R ∈ Zm×m¯, a
short basis TC ∈ Zm¯×m¯ of Λ⊥q (C), a vector u ∈ Znq and a rational σ such
that σ ≥ ‖T˜C‖ · Ω(
√
log n), and outputs a short vector b ∈ Zm+m¯ such that[
A A ·R + C ] · b = u mod q and with distribution statistically close to DL,σ
where L denotes the shifted lattice Λuq
(
[A | A ·R + C]).
2.2 Computational Problems
The security of our schemes provably relies on the assumption that both algo-
rithmic problems below are hard, i.e., cannot be solved in polynomial time with
non-negligible probability and non-negligible advantage, respectively.
Definition 2. Let m, q, β be functions of a parameter n. The Short Integer So-
lution problem SISn,m,q,β is as follows: Given A ←↩ U(Zn×mq ), find x ∈ Λ⊥q (A)
with 0 < ‖x‖ ≤ β.
If q ≥ √nβ and m,β ≤ poly(n), then SISn,m,q,β is at least as hard as standard
worst-case lattice problem SIVPγ with γ = O˜(β
√
n) (see, e.g., [24, Se. 9]).
Definition 3. Let n,m ≥ 1, q ≥ 2, and let χ be a probability distribution on Z.
For s ∈ Znq , let As,χ be the distribution obtained by sampling a ←↩ U(Znq ) and
e ←↩ χ, and outputting (a,aT · s + e) ∈ Znq × Zq. The Learning With Errors
problem LWEn,q,χ asks to distinguish m samples chosen according to As,χ (for
s←↩ U(Znq )) and m samples chosen according to U(Znq × Zq).
If q is a prime power, B ≥ √nω(log n), γ = O˜(nq/B), then there exists an
efficient sampleable B-bounded distribution χ (i.e., χ outputs samples with norm
at most B with overwhelming probability) such that LWEn,q,χ is as least as hard
as SIVPγ (see, e.g., [50,48,14]).
2.3 Syntax and Definitions of Group Encryption
We use the syntax and the security model of Kiayias, Tsiounis and Yung [34].
The group encryption (GE) primitive involves a sender, a verifier, a group man-
ager (GM) that manages the group of receivers and an opening authority (OA)
which is capable of identitying ciphertexts’ recipients. In the syntax of [34], a
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GE scheme is specified by the description of a relation R as well as a tuple
GE =
(
SETUP, JOIN, 〈Gr,R, sampleR〉,ENC,DEC,OPEN, 〈P,V〉
)
of algorithms
or protocols. In details, SETUP is a set of initialization procedures that all
take (implicitly or explicitly) a security parameter 1λ as input. We call them
SETUPinit(1
λ), SETUPGM(param) and SETUPOA(param). The first one of these
procedures generates a set of public parameters param (like the KTY construc-
tion [34], we rely on a common reference string even when using interaction
between provers and verifiers). The latter two procedures are used to produce
key pairs (pkGM, skGM), (pkOA, skOA) for the GM and the OA. In the following,
param is incorporated in the inputs of all algorithms although we sometimes
omit to explicitly write it.
JOIN = (Juser, JGM) is an interactive protocol between the GM and the prospec-
tive user. After the execution of JOIN, the GM stores the public key pk and its
certificate certpk in a public directory database. As in [35], we will restrict this
protocol to have minimal interaction and consist of only two messages: the first
one is the user’s public key pk sent by Juser to JGM and the latter’s response is
a certificate certpk for pk that makes the user’s group membership effective. We
do not require the user to prove knowledge of his private key sk or anything else
about it. In our construction, valid keys will be publicly recognizable and users
will not have to prove their validity. By avoiding proofs of knowledge of private
keys, the security proof never has to rewind the adversary to extract those pri-
vate keys, which allows supporting concurrent joins as advocated by Kiayias and
Yung [35]. If applications demand it, it is possible to add proofs of knowledge of
private keys in a modular way but our security proofs do not require rewinding
the adversary in executions of JOIN.
Algorithm sampleR allows sampling pairs (x,w) ∈ R (made of a public value
x and a witness w) using keys (pkR, skR) produced by Gr(1λ) which samples
public/secret parameters for the relation R. Depending on the relation, skR
may be the empty string (as in the scheme [34] and ours which both involve
publicly samplable relations). The testing procedure R(x,w) uses pkR to re-
turn 1 whenever (x,w) ∈ R. To encrypt a witness w such that (x,w) ∈ R for
some public x, the sender fetches the pair (pk, certpk) from database and runs
the randomized encryption algorithm. The latter takes as input w, a label L,
the receiver’s pair (pk, certpk) as well as public keys pkGM and pkOA. Its output
is a ciphertext Ψ ← ENC(pkGM, pkOA, pk, certpk, w, L). On input of the same ele-
ments, the certificate certpk, the ciphertext Ψ and the random coins coinsΨ that
were used to produce Ψ , the non-interactive algorithm P generates a proof piΨ
that there exists a certified receiver whose public key was registered in database
and who is able to decrypt Ψ and obtain a witness w such that (x,w) ∈ R. The
verification algorithm V takes as input Ψ , pkGM, pkOA, piΨ and the description of
R and outputs 0 or 1. Given Ψ , L and the receiver’s private key sk, the output of
DEC is either a witness w such that (x,w) ∈ R or a rejection symbol ⊥. Finally,
OPEN takes as input a ciphertext/label pair (Ψ,L) and the OA’s secret key skOA
and returns a receiver’s public key pk.
The model of [34] considers four properties termed correctness, message se-
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curity, anonymity and soundness. In the security definitions, stateful oracles
capture the adversary’s interaction with the system. In the soundness game, the
KTY model requires that pk belongs to the language of valid public keys. Here,
we are implicitly assuming that the space of valid public keys is dense (all ma-
trices are valid keys, as is the case in our scheme).
In the upcoming definitions, we sometimes use the notation 〈outputA|outputB〉
← 〈A(inputA), B(inputB)〉(common-input) to denote the execution of a protocol
between A and B obtaining their own outputs from their respective inputs.
Correctness. The correctness property requires that the following experiment
returns 1 with overwhelming probability.
Experiment Exptcorrectness(λ)
param← SETUPinit(1λ); (pkR, skR)← Gr(λ); (x,w)← sampleR(pkR, skR);
(pkGM, skGM)← SETUPGM(param); (pkOA, skOA)← SETUPOA(param);
〈pk, sk, certpk|pk, certpk〉 ← 〈Juser, JGM(skGM)〉(pkGM);
Ψ ← ENC(pkGM, pkOA, pk, certpk, w, L);
piΨ ← P(pkGM, pkOA, pk, cert, w, L, Ψ, coinsΨ );
If
(
(w 6= DEC(sk, Ψ, L)) ∨ (pk 6= OPEN(skOA, Ψ, L))
∨(V(Ψ,L, piΨ , pkGM, pkOA) = 0)
)
then return 0 else return 1;
Message Secrecy. The message secrecy property is defined by an experiment
where the adversary has access to oracles that may be stateful (and maintain a
state across queries) or stateless:
- DEC(sk): is a stateless oracle for the user decryption function DEC. When
this oracle is restricted not to decrypt a ciphertext-label pair (Ψ,L), we
denote it by DEC¬〈Ψ,L〉.
- CHbror(λ, pk, w, L): is a real-or-random challenge oracle which is only called
once. It returns (Ψ, coinsΨ ) such that Ψ ← ENC(pkGM, pkOA, pk, certpk, w, L)
if b = 1 whereas, if b = 0, Ψ ← ENC(pkGM, pkOA, pk, certpk, w′, L) encrypts a
random plaintext of length O(λ) uniformly sampled in the plaintext space.
In both cases, coinsΨ denote the random coins used to generate Ψ .
- PROVEbP,P′(pkGM, pkOA, pk, certpk, pkR, x, w, Ψ, L, coinsΨ ): is a stateful ora-
cle that can be invoked a polynomial number times. If b = 1, it replies by
running the real prover P on the inputs to create an actual proof piΨ . If
b = 0, the oracle runs a simulator P ′ that uses the same inputs as P except
witness w, coinsΨ and generates a simulated proof.
These oracles are used in an experiment where the adversary controls the GM,
the OA and all members except the honest receiver. The adversary A embodies
the dishonest GM that certifies the honest receiver in an execution of JOIN. It
is granted access to an oracle DEC which decrypts on behalf of that receiver. In
the challenge phase, it transmits a state information aux to itself and invokes the
challenge oracle for a label and a pair (x,w) ∈ R of its choice. After the challenge
phase, it can also query the PROVE oracle many times and finally attempts to
guess the challenger’s bit b.
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As pointed out in [34,18], designing an efficient simulator P ′ (for executing
PROVEbP,P′(.) when b = 0) is part of the security proof.
Definition 4. A GE scheme satisfies message security if, for any PPT adver-
sary A, the experiment below returns 1 with probability at most 1/2 + negl(λ).
Experiment ExptsecA (λ)
param← SETUPinit(1λ); (aux, pkGM, pkOA)← A(param);
〈pk, sk, certpk|aux〉 ← 〈Juser,A(aux)〉(pkGM);
(aux, x, w, L, pkR)← ADEC(sk,.)(aux); If (x,w) 6∈ R then return 0;
b←↩ {0, 1}; (Ψ, coinsΨ )← CHbror(λ, pk, w, L);
b′ ← APROVEbP,P′ (pkGM,pkOA,pk,certpk,pkR,x,w,Ψ,L,coinsΨ ),DEC¬〈Ψ,L〉(sk,.)(aux, Ψ);
If b = b′ then return 1 else return 0;
Anonymity. In the experiment modeling the anonymity property, the adversary
controls the entire system except the opening authority and two well-behaved
users. The challenger thus introduces two honest users’ public keys pk0, pk1 in
database and thus obtains certificate for both pk0, pk1 from the adversarially-
controlled GM. For a pair (x,w) ∈ R of its choice, the adversary obtains an
encryption of w under pkb for some b ∈ {0, 1} chosen by the challenger. The ad-
versary is provided with decryption oracles w.r.t. both keys pk0, pk1. In addition,
it has the following oracles at disposal:
- CHbanon(pkGM, pkOA, pk0, pk1, w, L): is a challenge oracle that is only queried
once by the adversary. It returns a pair (Ψ, coinsΨ ) consisting of a ciphertext
Ψ ← ENC(pkGM, pkOA, pkb, certpkb , w, L) and the coin tosses coinsΨ that were
used to generate Ψ .
- USER(pkGM): is a stateful oracle that obtains certificates from the adver-
sary by simulating two executions of Juser to introduce two honest users
in the group. It uses a string keys where the outputs (pk0, sk0, certpk0),
(pk1, sk1, certpk1) of honest users are written as long as the adversarially-
supplied certificates {certpkd}1d=0 are valid w.r.t. pkGM (i.e., invalid certifi-
cates are ignored by the oracle and no entry is introduced in keys for them).
- OPEN(skOA, .): is a stateless oracle that simulates the opening algorithm and,
on input of a GE ciphertext, returns the receiver’s public key.
The reason why the USER oracle is needed is that both honest users’ public
keys pk0, pk1 must have been properly certified by the adversarially-controlled
GM before the challenge phase because the adversary subsequently obtains proofs
generated using (pkb, certpkb).
Definition 5. A GE scheme satisfies anonymity if, for any PPT adversary A,
the experiment below returns 1 with a probability not exceeding 1/2 + negl(λ).
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Experiment ExptanonA (λ)
param← SETUPinit(1λ); (pkOA, skOA)← SETUPOA(param);
(aux, pkGM)← A(param, pkOA); aux← AUSER(pkGM),OPEN(skOA,.)(aux);
If keys 6= (pk0, sk0, certpk0 , pk1, sk1, certpk1)(aux) then return 0;
(aux, x, w, L, pkR)← AOPEN(skOA,.),DEC(sk0,.),DEC(sk1,.)(aux);
If (x,w) 6∈ R then return 0;
b←↩ {0, 1}; (Ψ, coinsΨ )← CHbanon(pkGM, pkOA, pk0, pk1, w, L);
b′ ← AP(pkGM,pkOA,pkb,certpkb ,x,w,Ψ,L,coinsΨ ,
OPEN¬〈Ψ,L〉(skOA,.),DEC¬〈Ψ,L〉(sk0,.),DEC¬〈Ψ,L〉(sk1,.))(aux, Ψ);
If b = b′ then return 1 else return 0;
Soundness. Here, the adversary creates the group of receivers by interacting
with the honest GM. Its goal is to produce a ciphertext Ψ and a convincing proof
that Ψ is valid w.r.t. a relation R of its choice but either: (1) The opening of
Ψ reveals a receiver’s public key pk that does not belong to any group member;
(2) The output pk of OPEN is not a valid public key (i.e., pk 6∈ PK, where PK
is the language of valid public keys); (3) The ciphertext C is not in the space
Cx,L,pkR,pkGM,pkOA,pk of valid ciphertexts. This notion is formalized by a game
where the adversary is given access to a user registration oracle REG(skGM, .)
that simulates JGM. This oracle maintains a list database where registered public
keys and their certificates are stored.
Definition 6. A GE scheme is sound if, for any PPT adversary A, the experi-
ment below returns 1 with negligible probability.
Experiment ExptsoundnessA (λ)
param← SETUPinit(1λ); (pkOA, skOA)← SETUPOA(param);
(pkGM, skGM)← SETUPGM(param);
(pkR, x, Ψ, piΨ , L, aux)← AREG(skGM,.)(param, pkGM, pkOA, skOA);
If V(Ψ,L, piΨ , pkGM, pkOA) = 0 return 0;
pk← OPEN(skOA, Ψ, L);
If
(
(pk 6∈ database) ∨ (pk 6∈ PK) ∨ (Ψ 6∈ Cx,L,pkR,pkGM,pkOA,pk))
then return 1 else return 0;
The model of Kiayias et al. [34] requires that pk belongs to the language of
valid public keys, so that the adversary is considered to defeat the soundness
property when (Ψ,L) opens to a key outside the language (i.e., pk 6∈ PK). In our
scheme, we will assume that the space of valid public keys is dense in that all
matrices of a given dimension are valid public keys, which have an underlying
private key. We nevertheless use the same definition as [34] in order to emphasize
that we are not relaxing the model in any way.
3 Warm-up: Decompositions, Extensions, Permutations
This section introduces the notations and techniques that will be used through-
out the paper. Part of the covered material appeared (in slightly different forms)
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in recent works [41,42,21,39,38] on Stern-like protocols [53]. The techniques that
will be employed for handling quadratic relations (double-bit extension ext(·, ·),
expansion expand⊗(·, ·) of matrix-vector product and the associated permuting
mechanisms) are novel contributions of this paper.
3.1 Decompositions
For any B ∈ Z+, define the number δB := blog2Bc+ 1 = dlog2(B + 1)e and the
sequence B1, . . . , BδB , where Bj = bB+2
j−1
2j c, ∀j ∈ [1, δB ]. As observed in [41],
the sequence satisfies
∑δB
j=1Bj = B and any integer v ∈ [0, B] can be decom-
posed into a binary vector idecB(v) = (v
(1), . . . , v(δB))> ∈ {0, 1}δB such that∑δB
j=1Bj · v(j) = v. We describe this decomposition procedure in a deterministic
manner:
1. v′ := v
2. For j = 1 to δB do:
(i) If v′ ≥ Bj then v(j) := 1, else v(j) := 0;
(ii) v′ := v′ −Bj · v(j).
3. Output idecB(v) = (v
(1), . . . , v(δB))>.
Next, for any positive integers m, B, we define the decomposition matrix:
Hm,B :=

B1 . . . BδB
B1 . . . BδB
. . .
B1 . . . BδB
 ∈ Zm×mδB , (1)
and the following injective functions:
(i) vdecm,B : [0, B]
m → {0, 1}mδB that maps vector v = (v1, . . . , vm)> to vector(
idecB(v1)
>‖ . . . ‖idecB(vm)>
)>
. Note that Hm,B · vdecm,B(v) = v.
(ii) vdec′m,B : [−B,B]m → {−1, 0, 1}mδB that maps vector w = (w1, . . . , wm)>
to vector
(
σ(w1) · idecB(w1)>‖ . . . ‖σ(wm) · idecB(wm)>
)>
, where for each
i = 1, . . . ,m: σ(wi) = 0 if wi = 0; σ(wi) = −1 if wi < 0; σ(wi) = 1 if
wi > 0. Note that Hm,B · vdec′m,B(w) = w.
We also define the following matrix decomposition procedure. For positive
integers n,m, q, define the injective function mdecn,m,q : Zm×nq → {0, 1}mnδq−1
that maps matrix X = [x1| . . . |xn] ∈ Zm×nq , where x1, . . . ,xn ∈ Zmq , to vector
mdecn,m,q(X) =
(
vdecm,q−1(x1)>‖ . . . vdecm,q−1(xn)>
)>
= (x1,1, . . . , x1,mk, x2,1, . . . , x2,mk, . . . , xn,1, xn,mk)
> ∈ {0, 1}nmδq−1 ,
where, for each (i, j) ∈ [n] × [mδq−1], xi,j ∈ {0, 1} denotes the j-th bit of the
decomposition of the i-th column of X.
Looking ahead, when proving knowledge of witnesses (X, s) ∈ Zm×nq × Znq
satisfying b = X · s + e mod q, we will have to consider terms of the form
xi,j · si,t, where s = (s1, . . . , sn)> ∈ Znq and (si,1, . . . , si,δq−1)> = idecq−1(si) for
each i ∈ [n].
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3.2 Extensions and Permutations
We now introduce the extensions and permutations which will be essential for
proving quadratic relations.
– For each c ∈ {0, 1}, denote by c the bit 1− c ∈ {0, 1}.
– For c1, c2 ∈ {0, 1}, define the vector
ext(c1, c2) = (c1 · c2, c1 · c2, c1 · c2, c1 · c2)> ∈ {0, 1}4.
– For b1, b2 ∈ {0, 1}, define the permutation Tb1,b2 that transforms vector
v = (v0,0, v0,1, v1,0, v1,1)
> ∈ Z4q to vector (vb1,b2 , vb1,b2 , vb1,b2 , vb1,b2)>.
Note that, for all c1, c2, b1, b2 ∈ {0, 1}, we have the following:
z = ext(c1, c2) ⇐⇒ Tb1,b2(z) = ext(c1 ⊕ b1, c2 ⊕ b2), (2)
where ⊕ denotes the bit-wise addition modulo 2.
Now, for positive integers n,m, k, and for vectors
x = (x1,1, . . . , x1,mk, x2,1, . . . , x2,mk, . . . , xn,1, xn,mk)
> ∈ {0, 1}nmk
and s0 = (s1,1, . . . , s1,k, s2,1, . . . , s2,k, . . . , sn,1, . . . , sn,k)
> ∈ {0, 1}nk, we define
the vector expand⊗(x, s0) ∈ {0, 1}4nmk2 as
expand⊗(x, s0) =
(
ext>(x1,1, s1,1)‖ext>(x1,1, s1,2)‖ . . . ‖ext>(x1,1, s1,k)‖
‖ ext>(x1,2, s1,1)‖ext>(x1,2, s1,2)‖ . . . ‖ext>(x1,2, s1,k)‖ . . .
‖ ext>(x1,mk, s1,1)‖ext>(x1,mk, s1,2)‖ . . . ‖ext>(x1,mk, s1,k)‖
‖ ext>(x2,1, s2,1)‖ext>(x2,1, s2,2)‖ . . . ‖ext>(x2,1, s2,k)‖ . . .
‖ ext>(x2,mk, s2,1)‖ext>(x2,mk, s2,2)‖ . . . ‖ext>(x2,mk, s2,k)‖ . . .
‖ ext>(xn,1, sn,1)‖ext>(xn,1, sn,2)‖ . . . ‖ext>(xn,1, sn,k)‖ . . .
‖ ext>(xn,mk, sn,1)‖ext>(xn,mk, sn,2)‖ . . . ‖ext>(xn,mk, sn,k)
)>
.
That is, expand⊗(x, s0) is obtained by applying ext to all pairs of the form
(xi,j , si,t) for (i, j, t) ∈ [n]× [mk]× [k].
Now, for b = (b1,1, . . . , b1,mk, b2,1, . . . , b2,mk, . . . , bn,1, bn,mk)
> ∈ {0, 1}nmk
and d = (d1,1, . . . , d1,k, d2,1, . . . , d2,k, . . . , dn,1, . . . , dn,k)
> ∈ {0, 1}nk, we define
the permutation Pb,d that transforms vector
v =
(
(v>1,1,1‖ . . . ‖v>1,1,k)‖(v>1,2,1‖ . . . ‖v>1,2,k)‖ . . . ‖(v>1,mk,1‖ . . . ‖v>1,mk,k)‖
(v>2,1,1‖ . . . ‖v>2,1,k)‖(v>2,2,1‖ . . . ‖v>2,2,k)‖ . . . ‖(v>2,mk,1‖ . . . ‖v>2,mk,k)‖
(v>n,1,1‖ . . . ‖v>n,1,k)‖(v>n,2,1‖ . . . ‖v>n,2,k)‖ . . . ‖(v>n,mk,1‖ . . . ‖v>n,mk,k)
)>∈Z4nmk2 ,
consisting of nmk2 blocks of length 4, to the vector Pb,d(v) of the form(
(w>1,1,1‖ . . . ‖w>1,1,k)‖(w>1,2,1‖ . . . ‖w>1,2,k)‖ . . . ‖(w>1,mk,1‖ . . . ‖w>1,mk,k)‖
(w>2,1,1‖ . . . ‖w>2,1,k)‖(w>2,2,1‖ . . . ‖w>2,2,k)‖ . . . ‖(w>2,mk,1‖ . . . ‖w>2,mk,k)‖




where for each (i, j, t) ∈ [n]× [mk]× [k]: wi,j,t = Tbi,j ,di,t(vi,j,t).
Observe that, for all b ∈ {0, 1}nmk,d ∈ {0, 1}nk, we have:
z = expand⊗(x, s0) ⇐⇒ Pb,d(z) = expand⊗(x⊕ b, s0 ⊕ d). (3)
Next, we recall the notations, extensions and permutations used in previous
Stern-like protocols [41,42,21,38] for proving linear relations.
For any positive integer t, denote by St the symmetric group of all permu-
tations of t elements, by B2t the set of all vectors in {0, 1}2t having Hamming
weight t, and by B3t the set of all vectors in {−1, 0, 1}3t having exactly t coordi-
nates equal to j, for each j ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. Note that for any φ ∈ S2t and ψ ∈ S3t,
we have the following equivalences:
x ∈ B2t ⇐⇒ φ(x) ∈ B2t and y ∈ B3t ⇐⇒ ψ(y) ∈ B3t. (4)
The following extending procedures are defined for any positive integers t.
– ExtendTwot : {0, 1}t → B2t. On input vector x with Hamming weight w, it
outputs x′ = (x>‖1t−w‖0w)>.
– ExtendThreet : {−1, 0, 1}t → B3t. On input vector y containing nj coordi-
nates equal to j for j ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, output y′ = (y>‖1t−n1‖0t−n0‖(−1)t−n−1).
We also use the following encodings and permutations to achieve fine-grained
control over coordinates of binary witness-vectors.
– For any positive integer t, define the function encodet that encodes vector
x = (x1, . . . , xt)
> ∈ {0, 1}t to vector encodet(x) = (x¯1, x1, . . . , x¯t, xt)> ∈
{0, 1}2t.
– For any positive integer t and any vector c = (c1, . . . , ct)
> ∈ {0, 1}t, define
the permutation F
(t)










Z2t into vector F (t)c (v) = (v(c1)1 , v
(c¯1)






Note that the following equivalence holds for all t, c:
y = encodet(x) ⇐⇒ F (t)c (y) = encodet(x⊕ c). (5)
To close this warm-up section, we remark that the equivalences observed
in (3), (4) and (5) will play crucial roles in our zero-knowledge layer.
4 The Supporting Zero-Knowledge Layer
In this section, we first demonstrate how to prove in zero-knowledge that a given
vector b is a correct LWE evaluation, i.e., b = X · s + e mod q, where the hidden
matrix X and vector s may satisfy additional conditions. This sub-protocol,
which we believe will have other applications, is one of the major challenges in
our road towards the design of lattice-based group encryption. We then plug this
building block into the big picture, and construct the supporting zero-knowledge
argument of knowledge (ZKAoK) for our group encryption scheme (Section 5).
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4.1 Proving the LWE Relation With Hidden Matrices
Let n,m, q, β be positive integers where β  q, and let k = δq−1 = dlog2 qe. We
identify Zq as the set {0, 1, . . . , q − 1}. We consider a zero-knowledge argument
system allowing prover P to convince verifier V on input b ∈ Zmq that P knows
secret matrix X ∈ Zm×nq , and vectors s ∈ Znq , e ∈ [−β, β]m such that:
b = X · s + e mod q. (6)
Moreover, the argument system should be readily extended to proving that X
and s satisfy additional conditions, such as:
– The bits representing X are certified by an authority, and the prover also
knows that secret signature-certificate.
– The (secret) hash of X is correctly encrypted to a given ciphertext.
– The LWE secret s is involved in other linear equations.
Let q1, . . . , qk ∈ Zq be the sequence of integers obtained by decomposing
q − 1 using the technique recalled in Section 3.1, and define the row vector
g = (q1, . . . , qk). Let X = [x1| . . . |xn] ∈ Zm×nq and s = (s1, . . . , sn)>. For each
index i ∈ [n], let us consider vdecm,q−1(xi) = (xi,1, . . . , xi,mk)> ∈ {0, 1}mk. Let
vdecn,q−1(s) = (s1,1, . . . , s1,k, s2,1, . . . , s2,k, . . . , sn,1, . . . sn,k)> ∈ {0, 1}nk and ob-
serve that si = g · idecq−1(si) = g · (si,1, . . . , si,k)> for each i ∈ [n]. We have:
X · s =
n∑
i=1
xi · si =
n∑
i=1




(xi,1 · si, . . . , xi,mk · si)>
)
mod q.
Observe that, for each i ∈ [n] and each j ∈ [mk], we have
xi,j · si = xi,j · g · (si,1, . . . , si,k)> = (q1, . . . , qk) · (xi,j · si,1, . . . , xi,j · si,k)>.
We now extend vector (q1, q2, . . . , qk) to g
′=(0, 0, 0, q1, 0, 0, 0, q2, . . . , 0, 0, 0, qk) ∈
Z4kq . For all (i, j) ∈ [n]× [mk], we have:
xi,j · si = g′ · (ext>(xi,j , si,1)‖ . . . ‖ext>(xi,j , si,k))>.
Let us define the matrices






 ∈ Zmk×4mk2q , (7)
and Q̂ = [
n times︷ ︸︸ ︷
Q0| . . . |Q0] ∈ Zmk×4nmk2q . For each i ∈ [n], define
yi = ( ext
>(xi,1, si,1)‖ . . . ‖ext>(xi,1, si,k))>‖ext>(xi,2, si,1‖ . . . ‖ext>(xi,2, si,k)
‖ . . . ‖ext>(xi,mk, si,1‖ . . . ‖ext>(xi,mk, si,k))> ∈ {0, 1}4mk2 .
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Then, for all i ∈ [n], we have: (xi,1 · si, . . . , xi,mk · si)> = Q0 · yi. Now, we note
that








Q0 · yi = Q̂ · expand⊗(mdecn,m,q(X), vdecn,q−1(s)). (8)
Letting Q = Hm,q−1 · Q̂ ∈ Zm×4nmk2q and left-multiplying (8) by Hm,q−1,
we obtain the equation:
X · s = Q · expand⊗(mdecn,m,q(X), vdecn,q−1(s)) mod q.
This means that the task of proving knowledge of (X, s, e) ∈ Zm×nq × Znq ×
[−β, β]m such that b = X · s + e mod q boils down to proving knowledge of
z ∈ {0, 1}4nmk2 , x ∈ {0, 1}nmk, s0 ∈ {0, 1}nk and a short e ∈ Zm such that
b = Q · z + Im · e mod q and z = expand⊗(x, s0).
As the knowledge of small-norm e can easily be proved with Stern-like proto-
col (e.g., [41]), the challenging part is to prove in ZK the constraint of z =
expand⊗(x, s0). To this end, we will use the following permuting technique in-
spired by the equivalence of equation (3). We sample uniformly random dx ∈
{0, 1}nmk and ds ∈ {0, 1}nk, send x′ = x⊕dx and s′ = s0⊕ds to the verifier, and
let the latter check that Pdx,ds(z) = expand
⊗(x′, s′). This will be sufficient to
convince the verifier that the original vector z satisfies the required constraint.
The crucial point is that no additional information about x and s0 is leaked,
since these binary vectors are perfectly hidden under the “one-time pad” dx and
ds, respectively.
In the framework of Stern’s protocol, the idea of using “one-time-pad” per-
mutations further allows us to prove that x and s0 satisfy additional conditions,
i.e., they appear in other equations. This is done by first setting up an equiv-
alence similar to (3) in the places where these objects appear, and then, using
the same “one-time pad” for each of them in all appearances. We will explain in
detail how this technique can be realized in the next subsection.
4.2 The Main Zero-Knowledge Argument System
The zero-knowledge argument of knowledge used in our group encryption scheme
(Section 5) will involve a system of 10 modular equations:
v1 = M1,1 ·w1 + M1,2 ·w2 + . . .+ M1,15 ·w15 mod q,
v2 = M2,1 ·w1 + M2,2 ·w2 + . . .+ M2,15 ·w15 mod q,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
v10 = M10,1 ·w1 + M10,2 ·w2 + . . .+ M10,15 ·w15 mod q,
(9)
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where {Mi,j}(i,j)∈[10]×[15], {vi}i∈[10] are public matrices and vectors (which are
possibly zero). Our goal is to prove knowledge of vectors w1, . . . ,w15, such
that (9) holds, and that these vectors have the following constraints.
1. w1 ∈ {0, 1}nm¯k, w2 ∈ {0, 1}nk and w3 = expand⊗(w1,w2) ∈ {0, 1}4nm¯k2 .
(Note that these vectors are obtained via the techniques of Section 4.1.)
2. w4,w5,w6,w7 are {0, 1} vectors.
3. Vectors w8, . . . ,w14 have bounded infinity norms.
4. Vector w15 has the form
(
d>1 ‖d>2 ‖ τ [1] · d>2 ‖ . . . ‖ τ [`] · d>2
)>
, for some
vectors d1,d2 ∈ [−β, β]m and τ = (τ [1], . . . , τ [`])> ∈ {0, 1}`.
Towards achieving the goal, we employ a 4-step strategy.
1. The first step transforms all the secret vectors with infinity norm larger
than 1 into vectors with infinity norm 1. This is done with the decomposition
technique of Section 3.1.
2. The norm-1 vectors is then encoded or extended into vectors whose con-
straints are invariant under random permutations. This is done with the
techniques described at the end of Section 3.2. The public matrices {Mi,j}i,j
are transformed accordingly to preserve the equations.
3. The third step unifies all the equations into one of the form M ·x = v mod q,
where x is a concatenation of the newly obtained witness-vectors.
4. In the final step, we run a Stern-like protocol to prove the unified equation
M · x = v mod q, where a composed permutation is employed to prove the
constraints of vector x.
Our strategy subsumes the central ideas underlying recent works on Stern-
like protocols [41,42,38] for lattice-based relations: preprocessing secret witness-
vectors to make them provable-in-zero-knowledge with random permutations,
unifying them into just one vector for the sake of convenience, and then running
Stern’s protocol in a classical manner.
The first step is applicable to vectors w8, . . . ,w14 and w15. Suppose that wi
has dimension mi and infinity norm bound βi, for i ∈ [8, 14]. Then we compute
vector w′i = vdecmi,βi(wi) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}miδβi . Note that Hmi,βi · w′i = wi. To
decompose w15, we compute d
′
j = vdecm,β(dj) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}mδβ , for j = 1, 2.
The second step performs the following encodings and extensions.
– Encode w1 and w2: Let w
′′
1 = encodenm¯k(w1) and w
′′
2 = encodenk(w2).
Note that to prove knowledge of w′′1 and w
′′
2 , we will employ the “one-time
pad” permuting technique implied by (5). The same one-time pads are used
to prove that w3 = expand
⊗(w1,w2), as discussed in Section 4.1.
– Extend vectors w4, . . . ,w7,w
′







For i ∈ [4, 7], suppose that the binary vector wi has dimension mi. Then
we extend it to w′′i = ExtendTwomi(wi) ∈ B2mi . For i ∈ [8, 14], we extend
w′i to w
′′
i = ExtendThreemiδβi (w
′
i) ∈ B3miδβi . It follows from (4) that, the
knowledge of vectors {w′′i }14i=4 can be proved in zero-knowledge using random
permutations.
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Meanwhile, we need a more sophisticated treatment for the components of
vector w15. For j = 1, 2, we let d
′′
j = ExtendThreemδβ (d
′
j) ∈ B3mδβ . We also
extend τ to τ ′′ = ExtendTwo`(τ) = (τ [1], . . . , τ [`], τ [`+ 1], . . . , τ [2`])> ∈ B2`.




> ‖ (d′′2)> ‖ τ [1](d′′2)> ‖ . . . ‖ τ [`](d′′2)> ‖ . . . ‖ τ [2`](d′′2)>
)>
.
Next, we define CorMix as the set of all vectors in {−1, 0, 1}(2`+2)3mδβ , that
have the form
(
z>1 ‖z>2 ‖ρ[1]z>2 ‖ . . . ‖ρ[2`]z>2
)>
for some z1, z2 ∈ B3mδβ and
ρ ∈ B2`. Clearly, w′′15 ∈ CorMix. Furthermore, as shown in [42,38], this set
is closed under a special composition of 3 permutations φ1 ∈ S3mδβ , φ2 ∈
S3mδβ , φ3 ∈ S2`, which we denote by Tφ1,φ2,φ3 . That is, we have the equiva-
lence:
w′′15 ∈ CorMix ⇐⇒ Tφ1,φ2,φ3(w′′15) ∈ CorMix. (10)
– As we have changed the dimensions of the witness-vectors, we also have to
transform the public matrices {Mi,j}i,j accordingly to preserve the equa-
tions. In short, this can be done through right-multiplying by the decom-
position matrices (if needed), and then inserting zero-columns at suitable
positions. We denote the transformed public matrices by {M′′i,j}i,j .
At the end of the second step, we are presented with the following system of
equations, which is equivalent to (9).
v1 = M
′′
1,1 ·w′′1 + M′′1,2 ·w′′2 + . . .+ M′′1,15 ·w′′15 mod q,
v2 = M
′′
2,1 ·w′′1 + M′′2,2 ·w′′2 + . . .+ M′′2,15 ·w′′15 mod q,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
v10 = M
′′
10,1 ·w′′1 + M′′10,2 ·w′′2 + . . .+ M′′10,15 ·w′′15 mod q.
(11)










2,2 . . . M
′′
2,15
. . . . . . . . . . . .
M′′10,1 M
′′
10,2 . . . M
′′
10,15













then we obtain the unified equation M · x = v mod q.
Given the above preparations, we now comes to the final step where we formally
present our protocol. Let D be the dimension of vector x. Denote by VALID the
set of all vectors in {−1, 0, 1}D, that have the form z = (z>1 ‖ . . . ‖z>15)>, where:
1. z1 = encodenm¯k(y1), z2 = encodenk(y2) and z3 = expand
⊗(y1,y2), for some
y1 ∈ {0, 1}nm¯k and y2 ∈ {0, 1}nk.
2. For i ∈ [4, 7], vector zi ∈ B2mi . For i ∈ [8, 14], vector zi ∈ B3miδβi .
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3. Vector z15 ∈ CorMix.
It can be seen that our vector x is an element of this tailored set VALID. By
construction, the task of proving knowledge of vectors w1, . . . ,w15 that have
the required constraints, and that satisfy system (9) has boiled down to proving
the possession of vector x ∈ VALID such that M · x = v mod q. We will fulfill
this task with a Stern-like zero-knowledge protocol, in which we hide x from the
verifier’s view by a random permutation and a random masking vector.
Let us determine the type of permutations to be applied for x. Let
S = {0, 1}nm¯k × {0, 1}nk × S2m4 × . . .× S2m7 × S3m8δβ8 × . . .
. . .× S3m14δβ14 × (S3mδβ )2 × S2`.






15) ∈ S with the
permutation Γpi that transforms vector z = (z
>
1 ‖ . . . ‖z>15)> ∈ ZD, where the
length of block zi equals to that of w
′′






(z1)‖F (nk)b2 (z2)‖Pb1,b2(z3)‖φ4(z4)‖ . . .
. . . ‖φ14(z14)‖Tφ115,φ215,φ315(z15)
)
.
It is implied by the equivalences given in (3), (5), (4) and (10) that the following
holds for all pi ∈ S:
x ∈ VALID ⇐⇒ Γpi(x) ∈ VALID.
Additionally, if x ∈ VALID and pi is uniformly random in S, then Γpi(x) is
uniformly random in VALID. In the framework of Stern’s protocol, these facts
allow us to prove in zero-knowledge the knowledge of x ∈ VALID.
Furthermore, proving that equation M · x = v mod q holds can be done by
sampling a uniformly random masking vector rx ∈ ZDq , and demonstrating to
the verifier that M · (x + rx)− v = M · rx mod q.
The interaction between prover P and verifier V is described in Figure 1.
Prior to the interaction, both parties obtain matrix M and vector v from the
public input, while P construct witness-vector x from his secret input, as de-
scribed above. The protocol employs the statistically hiding and computationally
binding string commitment scheme COM from [32].
The properties of the given protocol are summarized in Theorem 1. The
proof of the theorem employs standard simulation and extraction techniques for
Stern-like protocols [32,41,42], and is deferred to Appendix B.
Theorem 1. The protocol in Figure 1 is a statistical ZKAoK with perfect com-
pleteness, soundness error 2/3, and communication cost O˜(D log q). Namely:
– There exists a polynomial-time simulator that, on input (M,v), outputs an
accepted transcript which is statistically close to that produced by the real
prover.
19
1. Commitment: Prover samples rx ← U(ZDq ), pi ← U(S) and randomness ρ1, ρ2, ρ3




to the verifier, where
C1 = COM(pi,M · rx; ρ1), C2 = COM(Γpi(rx); ρ2), C3 = COM(Γpi(x + rx); ρ3).
2. Challenge: The verifier sends a challenge Ch← U({1, 2, 3}) to the prover.
3. Response: Depending on Ch, the prover sends RSP computed as follows:
– Ch = 1: Let tx = Γpi(x), tr = Γpi(rx), and RSP = (tx, tr, ρ2, ρ3).
– Ch = 2: Let pi2 = pi, y2 = x + rx, and RSP = (pi2,y2, ρ1, ρ3).
– Ch = 3: Let pi3 = pi, y3 = r, and RSP = (pi3,y3, ρ1, ρ2).
Verification: Receiving RSP, the verifier proceeds as follows:
– Ch = 1: Check that tx ∈ VALID and C2 = COM(tr; ρ2), C3 = COM(tx + tr; ρ3).
– Ch = 2: Check that C1 = COM(pi2,M · y2 − v; ρ1), C3 = COM(Γpi2(y2); ρ3).
– Ch = 3: Check that C1 = COM(pi3,M · y3; ρ1), C2 = COM(Γpi3(y3); ρ2).
In each case, the verifier outputs 1 if and only if all the conditions hold.
Fig. 1: Our zero-knowledge argument of knowledge.
– There exists a polynomial-time knowledge extractor that, on input a com-
mitment CMT and 3 valid responses (RSP1,RSP2,RSP3) to all 3 possible
values of the challenge Ch, outputs x′ ∈ VALID such that M · x′ = v mod q.
Note that, given vector x′ outputted by the extractor, one can efficiently com-
pute 15 vectors satisfying the conditions described at the beginning of this sub-
section, simply by “backtracking” the transformations conducted by our first 3
steps. In the group encryption scheme presented next, the constructed ZKAoK
will be invoked by algorithm 〈P,V〉, while its simulator and extractor will come
in handy in the proofs of Theorems 2, 3, and 4.
5 Our Lattice-Based Group Encryption Scheme
To build a GE scheme using our zero-knowledge argument system, we need to
choose a specific key-private CCA2-secure encryption scheme. The first idea is to
use the CCA2-secure public-key cryptosystem which is implied by the Agrawal-
Boneh-Boyen identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme [1] (which is recalled in
Appendix A.2) via the Canetti-Halevi-Katz (CHK) transformation [16]. The
ABB scheme is a natural choice since it has pseudo-random ciphertexts (which
implies the key-privacy [7] when the CHK paradigm is applied) and provides one
of the most efficient CCA2 cryptosystem based on the hardness of LWE in the
standard model. One difficulty is that the Kiayias-Tsiounis-Yung model [34] re-
quires that certified public keys be valid public keys (i.e., which have a matching
secret key). When new group members join the system and request a certificate
for their public key BU ∈ Zn×m¯q , a direct use of the ABB/CHK technique would
incur of proof of existence of a GPV trapdoor [24] corresponding to BU (i.e., a
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small-norm matrix TBU ∈ Zm¯×m¯ s.t. B ·TBU = 0n mod q). While the techniques
of Peikert and Vaikuntanathan [49] would provide a solution to this problem (as
they allow proving that TBU ∈ Zm¯×m¯ has full-rank), we found it simpler to rely
on the trapdoor mechanism of Micciancio and Peikert [44].
If we assume public parameters containing a random matrix A¯ ∈ Zn×mq , each
user’s public key can consist of a matrix BU = A¯·TU ∈ Zn×m¯q , where TU ∈ Zm×m¯
is a small-norm matrix whose calms are sampled from a discrete Gaussian dis-
tribution. Note that, if A¯ ∈ Zn×mq is uniformly distributed, then [24, Lemma
5.1] ensures that, with overwhelming probability, any matrix BU ∈ Zn×m¯q has
an underlying small-norm matrix satisfying BU = A¯ ·TU mod q. This simplifies
the joining procedure by eliminating the need for proofs of public key validity.
In the encryption algorithm, the sender computes a dual Regev encryp-
tion [24] of the witness w ∈ {0, 1}m using a matrix [A¯ | BU + FRD(VK) ·G] ∈
Zn×(m+m¯)q such that: (i) VK ∈ Znq is the verification key of a one-time signa-
ture; (ii) FRD : Znq → Zn×nq is the full-rank difference3 function of [1]; (iii)
G = In ⊗ [1|2| . . . |2k−1] ∈ Zn×m¯q is the gadget matrix of [44]. Given that G
has a publicly known trapdoor allowing to sample short vectors in Λ⊥q (G), the
user can use his private key TU ∈ Zm×m¯ to decrypt by running the SampleRight
algorithm of Lemma 5.
Having encrypted the witness w ∈ {0, 1}m by running the ABB encryption al-
gorithm, the sender proceeds by encrypting a hash value of BU ∈ Zn×m¯q under the
public key BOA = A¯·TOA ∈ Zn×m¯q of the opening authority. The latter hash value
is obtained as a bit-wise decomposition of F ·mdecn,m,q(B>U ) ∈ Z2nq , where F ∈
Z2n×nm¯dlog qeq is a random public matrix and mdecn,m,q(B>U ) ∈ {0, 1}nm¯dlog qe
denotes an entry-wise binary decomposition of the matrix BU ∈ Zn×m¯q .
By combining our new argument for quadratic relations and the extensions of
Stern’s protocol suggested in [42,38], we are able to prove that some component
of the ciphertext is of the form c = B>U · s + e ∈ Zm¯q , for some s ∈ Znq and a
small-norm e ∈ Zm¯ while also arguing possession of a signature on the binary
decomposition mdecn,m,q(B
>
U ) ∈ {0, 1}nm¯dlog qe of B>U . For this purpose, we use
a variant of a signature scheme due to Bo¨hl et al.’s signature [11] which was
recently proposed by Libert, Ling, Mouhartem, Nguyen and Wang [38] (and of
which a description is given in Appendix A.1). At the same time, the prover P
can also argue that a hash value of mdecn,m,q(B
>
U ) is properly encrypted under
the OA’s public key using the ABB encryption scheme.
5.1 Description of the Scheme
Our GE scheme allows encrypting witnesses for the Inhomogeneous SIS relation
RISIS(n,m, q, 1), which consists of pairs ((AR,uR),w) ∈ (Zn×mq ×Znq )× {0, 1}m
satisfying uR = AR · w mod q. This relation is in the same spirit as the one
of Kiayias, Tsiounis and Yung [34], who consider the verifiable encryption of
3 This means that, for any two distinct one-time verification keys VK,VK′ ∈ Znq , the
difference FRD(VK)− FRD(VK′) ∈ Zn×nq is invertible over Zq.
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discrete logarithms. While the construction of [34] allow verifiably encrypting
discrete-logarithm-type secret keys under the public key of some anonymous
TTP, our construction makes it possible to encrypt GPV-type secret keys [24].
SETUPinit(1
λ): This algorithm performs the following:
1. Choose integers n = O(λ), prime q = O˜(n4), and let k = dlog2 qe,
m¯ = nk and m = 2m¯ = 2nk. Choose a B-bounded distribution χ over
Z for some B =
√
nω(log n).
2. Choose a Gaussian parameter σ = Ω(
√
n log q log n). Let β = σω(log n)
be the upper bound of samples from DZ,σ.
3. Select integers ` = `(λ) which determines the maximum expected group
size 2`, and κ = ω(log λ) (the number of protocol repetitions).
4. Select a strongly unforgeable one-time signature OT S = (Gen,Sig,Ver).
We assume that the verification keys live in Znq .
5. Select public parameters COMpar for a statistically-hiding commitment
scheme like [32]. This commitment will serve as a building block for the
zero-knowledge argument system used in 〈P,V〉.
6. Let FRD : Znq → Zn×nq be the full-rank difference mapping from [1].
7. Pick a random matrix F← Z2n×nm¯kq , which will be used to hash users’
public keys from Zn×m¯q to Znq .
8. Let G ∈ Zn×m¯q be the gadget matrix G = In ⊗
[
1 2 . . . 2k−1
]
of [44].
Pick matrices A¯,U← U(Zn×mq ) and V← U(Zn×mq ). Looking ahead, U
will be used to encrypt for the receiver while V will be used to encrypt
the user’s public key under the OA’s public key. As for A¯, it will be used




λ, n, q, k,m,B, χ, σ, β, `, κ,OT S,COMpar,FRD, A¯,G,F,U,V
}
.
〈Gr, sampleR〉: Algorithm Gr(1λ, 1n, 1m) proceeds by sampling a random matrix
AR ← U(Zn×mq ) and outputting (pkR, skR) = (AR, ε). On input of a public
key pkR = AR ∈ Zn×mq for the relation RISIS, algorithm sampleR picks
w← U({0, 1}m) and outputs a pair ((AR,uR),w), where uR = AR ·w ∈ Znq .
SETUPGM(param): The GM generates (skGM, pkGM) ← Keygen(1λ, q, n,m, `, σ)
as a key pair for the SIS-based signature scheme of [38] (as recalled in Ap-
pendix A.1). This key pair consists of skGM := TA and
pkGM :=
(
A,A0, . . . ,A` ∈ Zn×mq , D0,D1 ∈ Zn×mq ,D ∈ Zn×m¯q ,u ∈ Znq
)
. (12)
SETUPOA(param): The OA samples a small-norm matrix TOA ← Dm¯Zm,σ in
Zm×m¯ to obtain a statistically uniform BOA = A¯ · TOA ∈ Zn×m¯q . The OA’s
key pair consists of (skOA, pkOA) = (TOA,BOA).
JOIN: The prospective user U and the GM interact in the following protocol.
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1. U first samples TU ← Dm¯Zm,σ in Zm×m¯ to compute a statistically uniform
matrix BU = A¯ ·TU ∈ Zn×m¯q . The prospective user defines his key pair
as (pkU, skU) = (BU,TU) and sends pkU = BU to the GM.
2. Upon receiving a public key pkU = BU ∈ Zn×m¯q from the user, the GM
certifies pkU via the following steps:
a. Compute hU = F·mdecn,m¯,q(B>U ) ∈ Z2nq as a hash value of the public
key pkU = BU ∈ Zn×m¯q .












= u + D · vdecn,q−1(D0 · r + D1 · vdecn,q−1(hU)) mod q, (14)
where τ = τ [1] . . . τ [`] ∈ {0, 1}`, as in the scheme of Section A.1.
U verifies that certU is tuple of the form (13) satisfying (14) and returns ⊥
if it is not the case. The GM stores (pkU, certU) in the user database
database and returns the certificate certU to the new user U .
ENC(pkGM, pkOA, pkU, certU,w, L): To encrypt a witness w ∈ {0, 1}m such that
((AR,uR),w) ∈ RISIS(n,m, q, 1) (i.e., AR · w = uR mod q), parse pkGM as
in (12), pkOA as BOA ∈ Zn×m¯q , pkU as BU ∈ Zn×m¯q and certU as in (13).
1. Generate a one-time key-pair (SK,VK)← Gen(1λ), where VK ∈ Znq .
2. Compute a full-rank-difference hash HVK = FRD(VK) ∈ Zn×nq of the
one-time verification key VK ∈ Znq .
3. Encrypt the witness w ∈ {0, 1}m under U’s public key BU ∈ Zn×m¯q using
the tag VK by taking the following steps:
a. Sample srec ← U(Znq ), Rrec ← Dm×m¯Z,σ and xrec,yrec ← χm. Compute
zrec = R
>




rec = A¯> · srec + yrec mod q
c
(2)
rec = (BU + HVK ·G)> · srec + zrec mod q;
c
(3)
















) ∈ Zmq ×Zm¯q ×Zmq , which forms an ABB
ciphertext [1] for the tag VK ∈ Znq .
4. Encrypt the decomposition vdecn,q−1(hU) ∈ {0, 1}m of the hashed pkU
under the OA’s public key BOA ∈ Zn×m¯q w.r.t. the tag VK ∈ Znq . Namely,
conduct the following steps:
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a. Sample soa ← U(Znq ), Roa ← Dm×m¯Z,σ , xoa ← χm,yoa ← χm. Set
zoa = R
>




oa = A¯> · soa + yoa mod q;
c
(2)
oa = (BOA + HVK ·G)> · soa + zoa mod q;
c
(3)
















) ∈ Zmq × Zm¯q × Zmq .
5. Compute a one-time signature Σ = Sig(SK, (crec, coa, L)).
Output the ciphertext
Ψ = (VK, crec, coa, Σ). (17)





DEC(skU,Ψ, L) : The decryption algorithm proceeds as follows:
1. If Ver
(
VK, Σ, (crec, coa, L)
)
= 0, return ⊥. Otherwise, parse the secret
key skU as TU ∈ Zm×m¯ and the ciphertext Ψ as in (17). Define the
matrix BVK = BU + FRD(VK) ·G ∈ Zn×m¯q .
2. Decrypt crec using a decryption key for the tag VK ∈ Zn. Namely,
a. Define BU,VK = [A¯|BVK] = [A¯|A¯ ·TU + FRD(VK) ·G] ∈ Zn×(m+m¯)q .
Using TU and the publicly known trapdoor TG of G, compute a
small-norm matrix EVK ∈ Z(m+m¯)×m such that BU,VK·EVK = U mod


















and return the obtained w ∈ {0, 1}m.
OPEN(skOA,Ψ, L) : The opening algorithm proceeds as follows:
1. If Ver
(
VK, Σ, (crec, coa), L
)
= 0, then return ⊥. Otherwise, parse skOA as
TOA ∈ Zm×m¯ and the ciphertext Ψ as in (17).
2. Decrypt coa using a decryption key for the tag VK ∈ Znq in the same way
as in the decryption algorithm. That is, do the following:
a. Define the matrix BOA,VK = [A¯|BOA + FRD(VK) ·G] ∈ Zn×(m+m¯)q .
Use TOA to compute a small-norm EOA,VK ∈ Z(m+m¯)×m satisfying


















and h′U = H2n,q−1 · h ∈ Z2nq .
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3. Look up database to find a public key pkU = BU ∈ Zn×m¯q that hashes
to h′U ∈ Z2nq (i.e., such that h′U = F ·mdecn,m¯,q(B>U )). If more than one
such key exists, return ⊥. If only one key pkU = BU ∈ Zn×m¯q satisfies
h′U = F · mdecn,m¯,q(B>U ), return that key pkU. In any other situation,
return ⊥.
〈P,V〉: The common input consists of param and pkGM as specified above, as
well as (AR,uR) ∈ Zn×mq × Znq , pkOA = BOA ∈ Zn×m¯q , and a ciphertext
Ψ as in (17). Both parties compute BOA,VK = [A¯|BOA + FRD(VK) ·G] as
specified above. The prover’s secret input consists of a witness w ∈ {0, 1}m,





used to generate Ψ.
The prover’s goal is to convince the verifier in zero-knowledge that his secret
input satisfies the following:
1. AR ·w = uR mod q.
2. hM = F ·mdecn,m,q(M) mod q.
3. Conditions (13) and (14) hold.
4. Vectors xrec,yrec,xoa,yoa have infinity norms bounded by B, and vectors
zrec, zoa have infinity norms bounded by βmB.
5. Equations in (15) and (16) hold.
To this end P conducts the following steps.
1. Decompose the matrix BU ∈ Zn×m¯q into bU = mdecn,m¯,q(B>U ) ∈ {0, 1}nm¯k
and the vectors srec, soa ∈ Znq into s0,rec = vdecn,q−1(srec) ∈ {0, 1}nk and
s0,oa = vdecn,q−1(soa) ∈ {0, 1}nk. Combine the first two binary vectors
into zΨ = expand
⊗(bU, s0,rec) ∈ {0, 1}4nm¯k2 . Define
Q = Hm¯,q−1 · [
n times︷ ︸︸ ︷
Q0| . . . |Q0] ∈ Zm¯×4nm¯k2q ,
where Q0 = Im¯k ⊗ g′ ∈ Zm¯k×4m¯k2q is the matrix defined as in (7).
2. Generate a zero-knowledge argument of knowledge of
τ ∈ {0, 1}`, d = [d>1 |d>2 ]> ∈ [−β, β]2m, r ∈ [−β, β]m
tU ∈ {0, 1}m, wU ∈ {0, 1}m¯
bU ∈ {0, 1}nm¯k, s0,rec ∈ {0, 1}nk, zΨ = expand⊗(bU, s0,rec)
xrec, yrec ∈ [−B,B]m, zrec ∈ [−βmB, βmB]m¯, w ∈ {0, 1}m,
s0,oa ∈ {0, 1}nk, xoa, yoa ∈ [−B,B]m, zoa ∈ [−βmB, βmB]m¯
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such that the following system of 10 equations holds:




τ [1] · d2
...
τ [`] · d2
+ (−D) ·wU mod q,
0 = Hn,q−1 ·wU + (−D0) · r + (−D1) · tU mod q,
0 = H2n,q−1 · tU + (−F) · bU mod q,
c
(1)
rec = (A¯> ·Hn,q−1) · s0,rec + Im · yrec mod q,
c
(2)
rec = Q · zΨ + (G> ·H>VK ·Hn,q−1) · s0,rec + Im¯ · zrec mod q,
c
(3)
rec = (U> ·Hn,q−1) · s0,rec + Im · xrec + (b q2c · Im) ·w mod q,
uR = AR ·w mod q,
c
(1)
oa = (A¯> ·Hn,q−1) · s0,oa + Im · yoa mod q,
c
(2)
oa = [(BOA + HVK ·G)> ·Hn,q−1] · s0,oa + Im¯ · zoa mod q,
c
(3)
oa = (V> ·Hn,q−1) · s0,oa + Im · xoa + (b q2c · Im) · tU mod q.
(18)
Let w1 = bU, w2 = s0,rec, w3 = zΨ = expand
⊗(bU, s0,rec), w4 = wU, w5 = tU,
w6 = s0,oa, w7 = w, w8 = xrec, w9 = yrec, w10 = zrec, w11 = r, w12 = xoa,
w13 = yoa, w14 = zoa and
w15 =
(
d>1 ‖d>2 ‖ τ [1]· d>2 ‖ . . . ‖ τ [`]· d>2
)>
.
Then system (18) can be rewritten as:
v1 = M1,1 ·w1 + M1,2 ·w2 + . . .+ M1,15 ·w15 mod q,
v2 = M2,1 ·w1 + M2,2 ·w2 + . . .+ M2,15 ·w15 mod q,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
v10 = M10,1 ·w1 + M10,2 ·w2 + . . .+ M10,15 ·w15 mod q,
(19)
where {Mi,j}(i,j)∈[10]×[15], {vi}i∈[10] are public matrices and vectors (which are
possibly zero).
The argument system is obtained by invoking the protocol from Section 4.2.
The protocol is repeated κ times to make the soundness error negligibly small.
5.2 Efficiency and Correctness
Efficiency. It can be seen that the given group encryption scheme can be
implemented in polynomial time. We now will evaluate the bit-sizes of keys and
ciphertext, as well as the communication cost of the protocol 〈P,V〉.
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– The public key of GM, as in (12), has bit-size O(`n2 log2 q) = O˜(`λ2).
– The public keys of OA and each user both have bit-size nm¯dlog2 qe = O˜(λ2).
– The secret key of each party in the scheme is a trapdoor of bit-size O˜(λ2).
The user’s certificate certU has bit-size O˜(λ).
– The ciphertext Ψ consists of VK ∈ Znq , two ABB ciphertexts of total size
2(2m+m¯)dlog2 qe and a one-time signatureΣ. Thus, its bit-size is O˜(λ)+
∣∣Σ∣∣.
– The communication cost of the protocol 〈P,V〉 is largely dominated by the
bit-size of the witness zΨ = expand
⊗(bU, s0,rec) ∈ {0, 1}4nm¯k2 . The total cost
is κ · O(n2 log4 q) = O˜(λ2) bits.
Correctness. The given group encryption scheme is correct with overwhelming
probability. We first remark that the scheme parameters are set up so that
the two instances of the ABB identity-based encryption [1] are correct. Indeed,




















Note that ‖xrec‖∞ and ‖yrec‖∞ are bounded byB, and ‖zrec‖∞ = ‖R>rec·yrec‖∞ ≤
βmB = O˜(n2). Furthermore, the entries of the discrete Gaussian matrix E>VK






O˜(n3.5) which is much smaller than q/4 = O˜(n4). As a result, the decryption
algorithm returns w with overwhelming probability. The correctness of algorithm
OPEN(skOA,Ψ, L) also follows from a similar argument.
Finally, we note that if a certified group user honestly follows all the pre-
scribed algorithms, then he should be able to compute valid witness-vectors to
be used in the protocol 〈P,V〉, and he should be accepted by the verifier, thanks
to the perfect completeness of the argument system in Section 4.2.
5.3 Security
Our scheme is proven secure under the SIS and LWE assumptions using clas-
sical reduction techniques. The security results are explicited in the following
theorems, for which some proofs have been deferred to Appendix C.
Theorem 2. The scheme provides anonymity if the LWE assumption holds and
if OT S is a strongly unforgeable one-time signature. (The proof is given in Ap-
pendix C.1.)
Theorem 3. The scheme provides message secrecy assuming that the LWE as-
sumption holds and that OT S is a strongly unforgeable one-time signature. (The
proof is presented in Appendix C.2.)
Theorem 4. The scheme provides soundness under the SIS assumption.
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Proof. To prove the result, we observe that, in order to break the soundness
property, the adversary must come up with a relation pkR = (AR,uR) ∈ Zn×mq ×




?), a label L and produce a convincing
proof piΨ? such that either
a. c?oa does not decrypt to a string h ∈ {0, 1}m such that hU = H2n,q−1 ·h ∈ Z2nq
coincides with hU = F ·mdecn,m,q(B>U ) for some pkU = BU ∈ Zn×m¯q appearing
in database.
b. c?oa opens to a certified public key pkU = BU ∈ Zn×m¯q , which belongs to
database (and for which a certificate was issued), but BU is outside the lan-
guage PK of valid public keys. This case is immediately ruled out by the
density of the public key space. Namely, all matrices BU ∈ Zn×m¯q are poten-
tially valid public keys as there always exist a small-norm matrix TU ∈ Zm×m¯
such that BU = A¯ ·TU mod q.
c. c?oa opens to a certified key pkU = BU for which Ψ




not a valid encryption of w ∈ {0, 1}m such that uR = AR ·w mod q.
d. The opening algorithm fails to uniquely identify the receiver. This occurs
if c?oa decrypts to a string h ∈ {0, 1}m such that h′U = H2n,q−1 · h ∈ Z2nq
corresponds to at least two distinct public keys BU,0,BU,1 ∈ Zn×m¯q which
satisfy
h′U = F ·mdecn,m¯,q(B>U,0) mod q = F ·mdecn,m¯,q(B>U,1) mod q.
Since mdecn,m¯,q(.) : Zm¯×nq → {0, 1}nm¯k is an injective function, the above
equality necessarily implies a collision for the SIS-based hash function built
upon F ∈ Z2n×nm¯kq : namely,
mdecn,m¯,q(B
>
U,0)−mdecn,m¯,q(B>U,1) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}nm¯k
is a short non-zero vector of Λ⊥q (F).
Having shown that cases b and d cannot occur if the SIS assumption holds,
we only need to consider cases a and c. The computational soundness of the
argument system ensures that, by replaying the soundness adversary a sufficient
number of times, the knowledge extractor will be able to extract either: (i)
A breach in the computational soundness of the argument system and thus
the binding property of the commitment scheme COM (which relies on the SIS
assumption with the commitment scheme of [32]). Note that this situation covers
case (c.) above. (ii) A set of witnesses
τ ∈ {0, 1}`, d = [d>1 |d>2 ]> ∈ [−β, β]2m, r ∈ [−β, β]m
tU ∈ {0, 1}m, wU ∈ {0, 1}m¯
bU ∈ {0, 1}nm¯k, s0,rec ∈ {0, 1}nk, zΨ ∈ {0, 1}4nm¯k2
xrec, yrec ∈ [−B,B]m, zrec ∈ [−βmB, βmB]m¯, w ∈ {0, 1}m,
soa ∈ {0, 1}nk, xoa, yoa ∈ [−B,B]m, zoa ∈ [−βmB, βmB]m¯
satisfying relations (18). Given that witnesses τ ∈ {0, 1}`, d ∈ [−β, β]2m, r ∈
[−β, β]m and tU ∈ {0, 1}m satisfy (18), it comes that (τ,d, r) form a valid
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signature for the message tU ∈ {0, 1}m. At this point, case a implies that no
matrix BU ∈ Zn×m¯q of database decomposes to a string hU ∈ {0, 1}nm¯k such that
tU = vdecn,q−1(F · hU mod q) was signed by the reduction during an execution




forms a forgery for the SIS-
based signature scheme of Appendix A.1. The reduction is straightforward and
omitted. uunionsq
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A Building Blocks
A.1 Signatures Supporting Zero-Knowledge Proofs
We use a signature scheme proposed by Libert, Ling, Mouhartem, Nguyen and
Wang [38] who extended the Bo¨hl et al. signature [11] (which is itself built upon
Boyen’s signature [13]) into a signature scheme compatible with zero-knowledge
proofs. While the scheme was designed to sign messages comprised of multiple
blocks, we only use the single-block version here.
Keygen(1λ, q, n,m, `, σ): This algorithm takes as input a security parameter λ >
0 as well as the following parameters: n = O(λ); a prime modulus q = O˜(n4);
dimension m = 2ndlog qe; an integer ` = poly(λ); and Gaussian parameters
σ = Ω(
√
n log q log n). It defines the message space as {0, 1}m.
1. Run TrapGen(1n, 1m, q) to get A ∈ Zn×mq and a short basis TA of Λ⊥q (A).
This basis allows computing short vectors in Λ⊥q (A) with a Gaussian
parameter σ. Next, choose `+ 1 random A0,A1, . . . ,A` ←↩ U(Zn×mq ).
2. Choose random matrices D←↩ U(Zn×m/2q ), D0,D1 ←↩ U(Zn×mq ) as well
as a random vector u←↩ U(Znq ).
The private key consists of SK := TA and the public key is
PK :=
(







: To sign a message m ∈ {0, 1}m,
1. Choose a random binary string τ ←↩ U({0, 1}`). Then, using SK := TA,
compute a short delegated basis Tτ ∈ Z2m×2m for the matrix
Aτ = [A | A0 +
∑`
j=1
τ [j]Aj ] ∈ Zn×2mq . (20)
2. Choose a discrete Gaussian vector r ←↩ DZm,σ. Compute cM ∈ Znq as a
chameleon hash of m. Namely, compute cM = D0 ·r+D1 ·m ∈ Znq , which
is used to define uM = u + D · vdecn,q−1(cM ) ∈ Znq . Using the delegated
basis Tτ ∈ Z2m×2m, sample a short vector v ∈ Z2m in DΛuMq (Aτ ),σ.
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: Given PK, m ∈ {0, 1}m and sig = (τ,v, r) ∈ {0, 1}` ×
Z2m × Zm, return 1 if ‖v‖ < σ√2m, ‖r‖ < σ√m and
Aτ · v = u + D · vdecn,q−1(D0 · r + D1 ·m) mod q. (21)
Like [13,11], the scheme of [38] was proved secure under the SIS assumption
and shown to easily interact with Stern-like protocols when it comes to proving
knowledge of a hidden message-signature pair. While such proofs would also be
possible using Boyen’s signature [13], the number of public matrices {Aj}`j=0 in
the public key can be reduced from Θ(n · log q) to Θ(λ) using the scheme of [38].
The above description uses a slightly different variant of [38] where, at step 2
of the signing algorithm, a different binary decomposition of cM is used to com-
pute uM : while [38] uses the standard binary decomposition, we use a non-unique
encoding based on the vdec function for convenience. However, the security proof
of [38] goes through with this encoding since the function vdecn,q−1(.) is injective.
Lemma 6 ([38, Th. 1]). The above signature scheme is unforgeable under
chosen-message attacks if the SIS assumption holds.
A.2 The Agrawal-Boneh-Boyen IBE Scheme
Identity-Based Encryption. An IBE scheme is a tuple of efficient algorithms
(Setup,ExtractPP,EncryptPP,DecryptPP) such that
Setup(1λ): On security parameter λ, this algorithm outputs public parameters
PP and a master secret key msk.
ExtractPP(msk, ID): Takes as input a master secret key msk and an identity ID
and outputs a secret key skID.
EncryptPP(ID,M): Given an identity ID and a message M , it outputs a cipher-
text C.
DecryptPP(skID, C): Given a secret key skID and a ciphertext C, outputs either
a decryption error symbol ⊥, or a message M .
Correctness requires that, for any pair (PP,msk) ← Setup(1λ), any ID and any





Our proofs rely on the semantic security of the scheme against selective ad-
versaries (IND-sID-CPA) but also on the stronger property of ciphertext pseudo-
randomness. Informally, this notions demands that the adversary be unable to
distinguish an encryption of a message of its choice from a random element of
the ciphertext space C. Notice that this property implies IND-sID-CPA security.
Definition 7. An IBE scheme has pseudo-random-ciphertexts if no PPT ad-
versary A with access to private key extraction oracle ExtractPP(msk, ·) has non-
negligible advantage AdvRORA (λ) = |Pr
[
ExptRORA = 1
]− 12 | in this game:
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Experiment ExptRORA (λ)
ID? ← Aid(λ); (PP,msk)← Setup(1λ);
M ← AExtractPP(msk,·)Ch (PP);
b←↩ U({0, 1});
if b = 1 then C? ← EncryptPP(M, ID?) else C? ← U(C);
b′ ← AExtractPP(msk,·)guess (C?);
if b = b′ then return 1 else return 0;
The ABB System. Agrawal, Boneh and Boyen described [1] a compact IBE
scheme in the standard model which allows encrypting multi-bit messages.
Setup(1λ): Given a security parameter λ, choose parameters q, n, σ, α and define
k = blog qc, m¯ = nk, m = 2m¯ and choose a noise distribution χ for LWE.
1. Compute (A¯,TA¯)← TrapGen(1n, 1m, q).
2. Define G = In⊗[1|2| . . . |2k−1] ∈ Zn×m¯q . Sample matrices B←↩ U(Zn×m¯q ),
U←↩ U(Zn×mq ).





and msk = TA¯.
ExtractPP(msk, ID): Given msk = TA¯ and an identity ID ∈ Znq , do as follows:
1. Define the matrix BID = B + FRD(ID) ·G ∈ Zn×m¯q .
2. Let BA,ID = [A | BID] ∈ Zn×(m+m¯)q , use TA to compute a delegated
basis TID for the lattice Λ
⊥(BA,ID).
3. Use TID to sample a small-norm matrix EID ∈ Z(m+m¯)×m satisfying the
equality BA,ID ·EID = U mod q.
4. Output skID = EID ∈ Z(m+m¯)×m.
EncryptPP(ID,m): Given an identity ID and a message m ∈ {0, 1}m,
1. Compute the matrix BID = B + FRD(ID) ·G ∈ Zn×m¯q . Sample vectors
s←↩ U(Znq ),x,y←↩ χm, R←↩ Dm×m¯Z,σ and compute z = R> · y ∈ Zm.
2. Compute 
c(1) = A¯> · s + y mod q,
c(2) = B>ID · s + z mod q,






3. Output c =
(
c(1), c(2), c(3)
) ∈ Zmq × Zm¯q × Zmq .
DecryptPP(skID, c): Given skID = EID and c =
(
c(1), c(2), c(3)
) ∈ Zmq ×Zm¯q ×Zmq ,












Theorem 5 ([1, Th. 23]). The ABB IBE scheme has pseudo-random cipher-
texts if the LWEn,q,χ assumption holds.
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B Proof of Theorem 1
We first restate Theorem 1.
Theorem 6. The protocol in Figure 1 is a statistical ZKAoK with perfect com-
pleteness, soundness error 2/3, and communication cost O˜(D log q). In particu-
lar:
– There exists an efficient simulator that, on input (M,v), outputs an accepted
transcript which is statistically close to that produced by the real prover.
– There exists an efficient knowledge extractor that, on input a commitment
CMT and 3 valid responses (RSP1,RSP2,RSP3) to all 3 possible values of
the challenge Ch, outputs x′ ∈ VALID such that M · x′ = v mod q.
Proof. It can be checked that the protocol has perfect completeness: If an honest
prover follows the protocol, then he always gets accepted by the verifier. It is
also easy to see that the communication cost is bounded by O˜(D log q).
We now prove that the protocol is a statistical zero-knowledge argument of
knowledge.
Zero-Knowledge Property. We construct a PPT simulator SIM interacting
with a (possibly dishonest) verifier V̂, such that, given only the public input, SIM
outputs with probability negligibly close to 2/3 a simulated transcript that is
statistically close to the one produced by the honest prover in the real interaction.
The simulator first chooses a random Ch ∈ {1, 2, 3} as a prediction of the
challenge value that V̂ will not choose.
Case Ch = 1: Using basic linear algebra over Zq, SIM computes a vector x′ ∈
ZDq such that M · x′ = v mod q. Next, it samples rx ← U(ZDq ), pi ← U(S),








C ′1 = COM(pi,M · rx; ρ1),
C ′2 = COM(Γpi(rx); ρ2), C
′
3 = COM(Γpi(x
′ + rx); ρ3).
Receiving a challenge Ch from V̂, the simulator responds as follows:
– If Ch = 1: Output ⊥ and abort.
– If Ch = 2: Send RSP =
(
pi,x′ + rx, ρ1, ρ3
)
.
– If Ch = 3: Send RSP =
(
pi, rx, ρ1, ρ2
)
.
Case Ch = 2: SIM samples x′ ← U(VALID), rx ← U(ZDq ), pi ← U(S), and ran-









C ′1 = COM(pi,M · rx; ρ1),
C ′2 = COM(Γpi(rx); ρ2), C
′
3 = COM(Γpi(x
′ + rx); ρ3).
Receiving a challenge Ch from V̂, the simulator responds as follows:
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– If Ch = 1: Send RSP =
(
Γpi(x
′), Γpi(rx), ρ2, ρ3
)
.
– If Ch = 2: Output ⊥ and abort.
– If Ch = 3: Send RSP =
(
pi, rx, ρ1, ρ2
)
.
Case Ch = 3: SIM samples x′ ← U(VALID), rx ← U(ZDq ), pi ← U(S), and ran-








to V̂, where C ′2 = COM(Γpi(rx); ρ2), C ′3 = COM(Γpi(x′+rx); ρ3) as in the previous
two cases, while
C ′1 = COM(pi,M · (x′ + rx)− v; ρ1).
Receiving a challenge Ch from V̂, it responds as follows:
– If Ch = 1: Send RSP computed as in the case (Ch = 2, Ch = 1).
– If Ch = 2: Send RSP computed as in the case (Ch = 1, Ch = 2).
– If Ch = 3: Output ⊥ and abort.
We observe that, in every case we have considered above, since COM is statis-
tically hiding, the distribution of the commitment CMT and the distribution of
the challenge Ch from V̂ are statistically close to those in the real interaction.
Hence, the probability that the simulator outputs ⊥ is negligibly close to 1/3.
Moreover, one can check that whenever the simulator does not halt, it will pro-
vide an accepted transcript, the distribution of which is statistically close to
that of the prover in the real interaction. In other words, we have constructed a
simulator that can successfully impersonate the honest prover with probability
negligibly close to 2/3.













2 ) are 3 valid responses to the same
commitment CMT = (C1, C2, C3), with respect to all 3 possible values of the
challenge. The validity of these responses implies that:
tx ∈ VALID;
C1 = COM(pi2,M · y2 − v; ρ(2)1 ) = COM(pi3,M · y3; ρ(3)1 );
C2 = COM(tr; ρ
(1)
2 ) = COM(Γpi3(y3); ρ
(3)
2 );
C3 = COM(tx + tr; ρ
(1)
3 ) = COM(Γpi2(y2); ρ
(2)
3 ).
Since COM is computationally binding, we can deduce that:
tx ∈ VALID;pi2 = pi3; tr = Γpi3(y3); tx+tr = Γpi2(y2); M ·y2−v = M ·y3 mod q.
Let x′ = y2 − y3, then we have Γpi2(x′) = tx ∈ VALID which implies that
x′ ∈ VALID. Furthermore, we have M · x′ = M · (y2 − y3) = v mod q.
This concludes the proof. uunionsq
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C Security Proofs for the Group Encryption Scheme
C.1 Anonymity (Proof of Theorem 2)
Proof. We consider a sequence of games where the first game is the real exper-
iment of definition 5 while, in the final game, the adversary A is essentially an
adversary against the anonymity of the Agrawal-Boneh-Boyen IBE scheme [1].
In Game i, we call Wi the event that the challenger outputs 1.
Game 1: The challenger B generates public parameters param, which include
matrices A¯,U,V ∈ Zn×mq and F ∈ Z2n×nm¯kq . The opening authority’s public
key pkOA = BOA ∈ Zn×m¯q is given to A who generates a group manager’s public
key pkGM of its own. By invoking the USER oracle, A registers two distinct re-
ceivers’ public keys pkU,0 = BU,0 ∈ Zn×m¯q , pkU,1 = BU,1 ∈ Zn×m¯q chosen by the
challenger. It also makes a number of opening queries and decryption queries,
which the challenger handles using skOA = TOA and skU,0 = TU,0, skU,1 = TU,1,
respectively. After a while, the adversary outputs ((AR,uR),w, L) such that
uR = AR ·w mod q, with AR ∈ Zn×mp , uR ∈ Znq and w ∈ {0, 1}m. In return, A
obtains, as a challenge, a group encryption Ψ? = (VK?, c?rec, c
?
oa, Σ
?). of the wit-
ness w under pkU,b = BU,b, for some random bit b← U({0, 1}) of the challenger’s
choice. Then, the adversary obtains proofs pi?Ψ? for Ψ
? and makes further opening
and decryption queries under the natural restrictions of Definition 5. When the
adversary A halts, it outputs a bit b′ ∈ {0, 1} and the challenger outputs 1 if
and only if b′ = b.
Game 2: This game is like Game 1 except the challenger aborts in the event that
the adversary A queries the opening of a ciphertext Ψ = (VK, crec, coa, Σ) such
that VK = VK? and σ is valid (we assume w.l.o.g. that VK? is generated ahead
of time). If this event occurs, the adversary A is necessarily able to break the
strong unforgeability of OT S (note that, if the query occurs before the challenge
phase, it means that A has forged a signature without seeing a signature at all).
There thus exist a one-time signature forger B such that |Pr[W2] − Pr[W1]| ≤
AdvotsB (λ), which means that Game 2 is identical to Game 1 so long as OT S is
a strongly unforgeable one-time signature.
Game 3: In this game, we modify the generation of proofs pi?Ψ? : instead of
generating proofs using the real witnesses, we appeal to the zero-knowledge
simulator of the argument system of Section 4.2 at each invocation of P af-
ter the challenge phase. Note that, since we assume public parameters generated
by a trusted party, the statistical ZK simulator is allowed to use a trapdoor
embedded in param to generate simulated proofs (using, e.g., Damg˚ard’s tech-
nique [20]). The statistical zero-knowledge property of the argument system
ensures that A’s view remains statistically close to that of Game 2: we have
|Pr[W3]− Pr[W2]| ≤ negl(λ).
Game 4: We now modify the generation of the challenge ciphertext Ψ?. In
this game, the challenger computes the ciphertext c?oa as an ABB encryption
under the identity VK? of a random m-bit string instead of a decomposition
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vdecn,q−1(hU,b) ∈ {0, 1}m of hU,b = F · mdecn,m¯,q(B>U,b) ∈ Z2nq . Since the ran-






oa are no longer used to generate proofs
piΨ? , we can show that any noticeable change in A’s output distribution implies
a selective adversary against the ABB IBE, as established by Lemma 7, which
would contradict the LWE assumption. The result of Agrawal et al. [1, Theo-
rem 23] (recalled in Theorem 5) indeed implies |Pr[W4]−Pr[W3]| ≤ AdvLWE(λ).
In Game 4, we can show that, if the adversary A has noticeable advantage in
the anonymity game, we can break the anonymity of the ABB IBE system, as
shown in the proof of Lemma 8. From the result of [1, Theorem 23], we deduce
that |Pr[W4]− 1/2| ≤ AdvLWE(λ), which implies the announced result. uunionsq
Lemma 7. Any PPT adversary such that Pr[W4] is noticeably different from
Pr[W3] implies a selective adversary against the ABB IBE scheme.
Proof. Let A be a PPT adversary for which |Pr[W4]− Pr[W3]| = ε is non-
negligible. We use A to build a selective adversary against the ABB IBE system.
At the outset of the game, the reduction B generates a one-time signature
key pair (VK?,SK?) and declares VK? as the target identity to its challenger for




) ∈ Zn×mq × Zn×m¯q × Zn×mq .
Next, the reduction runs the appropriate steps of the actual SETUPinit al-
gorithm to obtain COMpar, F ∈ Z2n×nm¯kq and U ∈ Zn×mq . Namely, B samples
F←↩ U(Z2m×nm¯kq ) and U←↩ U(Zn×mq ) like in the SETUPinit algorithm and sends
param =
{
λ, n, q, k,m,B, χ, σ, β, `, κ,OT S,COMpar,FRD, A¯,G,F,U,V
}
along with pkOA = B ∈ Zn×m¯q to the adversary A.
In return, the adversary A chooses pkGM, which allows it to enroll two users
for whom B faithfully generates (pkU,i, skU,i)i∈{0,1}. Knowing both private keys
{skU,i = TU,i}i∈{0,1}, B is able to perfectly simulate the DEC(·) oracle.
Open Queries. To answer opening queries for ciphertexts Ψ = (VK, crec, cOA, Σ)
and labels L, B first checks that Ver(VK, Σ, (crec, cOA, L)) = 1. If this test fails,
B returns ⊥. Otherwise, B queries its IBE challenger to obtain a IBE private
key TOA,VK ∈ Z(m+m¯)×m for identity VK 6= VK?. The IBE challenger’s response
allows B to decrypt cOA and figure out the identity of the receiver by looking up
database. The result of the opening operation is then returned to A.
After a number of queries, A decides to move to the challenge phase and





such that uR = AR ·w? mod q. The
reduction handles this query by requesting a challenge ciphertext for the IBE
security game with the messages m0 = vdecn,q−1(hU,b), for some random bit
b ←↩ U({0, 1}) and m1 ← U({0, 1}m). In return, B obtains a challenge cipher-
text c?OA under identity VK
?, which is embedded in A’s challenge ciphertext.
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Namely, Ψ? = (VK?, c?rec, c
?
OA, Σ
?) is obtained by computing c?rec as an ABB
encryption of the witness w? using the matrix BU,b ∈ Zn×m¯q as in (15) and
Σ? = Sign(SK?, (c?rec, c
?
OA, L
?)). All queries to the proving oracle P are replied
by returning a simulated ZK argument as in Game 3.
When A halts, it outputs a bit b′ ∈ {0, 1}. If b = b′, B returns the bit 0 as
a guess that the selective security challenger encrypted m0 = vdecn,q−1(hU,b).
Otherwise, B outputs 1 meaning that the IBE challenger chose to encrypt m1,
which was chosen independently of the value of b ∈ {0, 1}. If we call Random
(resp. Real) the event that the IBE challenger chooses to encrypt m1 (resp. m0),
we can assess the advantage of the reduction B as
AdvsID-CPAB (λ) = |Pr[b = b′ | Random]− Pr[b = b′ | Real]|
= |Pr[W4]− Pr[W3]|
= ε,
which proves the result. uunionsq
Lemma 8. In Game 4, the adversary’s advantage is negligible assuming that
the ABB IBE has pseudo-random ciphertexts.
Proof. Let us assume the existence of a PPT adversary A with non negligible
advantage ε in Game 4. From A, we construct a selective adversary B that can
distinguish ABB ciphertexts from random elements of the ciphertext space with
non-negligible advantage in the game described in Definition 7.
First, B generates (SK?,VK?) via the key generation algorithm of the one-





) ∈ Zn×mq × Zn×m¯q × Zn×mq
from its real-or-random (ROR) challenger.
Our reduction uses PP to compute public parameters for our GE scheme. To
this end, it samples F←↩ U(Z2n×nm¯kq ), V ←↩ U(Zn×mq ) as in the real SETUPinit
algorithm. The reduction B also computes BOA = A¯ · TOA mod q, where the
small-norm matrix TOA is sampled from D
m×m¯
Z,σ , and sends A the parameters
param =
{
λ, n, q, k,m, σ, β, `, κ,OT S,COMpar,FRD, A¯,G,F,U,V
}
,
where A¯ is taken from PP, along with pkOA = BOA. The rest of the keys are
generated as in Game 4.
The reduction B then tosses a coin b ←↩ U({0, 1}). When the adversary A
triggers an execution of the join protocol, B generates the public keys (pki)i∈{0,1}
by defining pkU,b = B using the matrix B ∈ Zn×m¯q supplied by the ROR chal-
lenger as part of PP and generates (pkU,1−b, sk1−b) = (BU,1−b = A¯ ·T1−b,T1−b)
for a secret key T1−b ← Dm¯Zm,σ of its own. The two public keys (pkU,i)i∈{0,1} are
then certified by the adversarially-controlled GM. Notice that in the adversary’s
view, both public keys pkU,b and pkU,1−b are identically distributed.
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To answer decryption queries (Ψ = (VK, crec, cOA, Σ), L), for any query per-
taining to pkU,b, the reduction invokes its ROR challenger to obtain an IBE
private key for the identity VK 6= VK? and uses the result to decrypt crec. For
any decryption query involving pkU,1−b, the reduction can faithfully run the ac-
tual decryption algorithm using its trapdoor T1−b. Open queries are answered
using TOA as in the real Open algorithm.
When the adversary A decides to do so, it queries a challenge for a triple
((AR,uR),w, L) of its choice subject to the constraint uR = AR · w. At this
point, B queries a challenge to its own challenger for the message w and obtains
a ciphertext c, which is embedded in Ψ? = (VK?, c, c?OA, Σ
?) while c?OA and Σ
?
are generated as in Game 3 (in particular, c?OA encrypts a random string instead
of a hash value of pkU,b). After the challenge phase, all queries to the proving
oracle P are replied by returning a simulated ZK argument as in Game 3.
When A ends, it outputs a bit b′ ∈ {0, 1}. If b′ = b, the reduction outputs
Real. Otherwise, it outputs Random. Indeed, if the ROR challenger is playing
the real game, we are exactly in Game 4: we have Pr[b′ = b|Real] = Pr[W4].
Otherwise, the challenge ciphertext Ψ? is completely independent of b ∈ {0, 1}
so that we can only have b′ = b with probability Pr[b′ = b|Random] = 1/2. It
follows that AdvRORB (λ) ≥ |Pr[W4]− 1/2|. uunionsq
C.2 Message Secrecy (Proof of Theorem 3)
Proof. We proceed via a sequence of games. The first one corresponds to the
experiment of Definition 4 when the challenger’s bit b is 1 and the adversary
obtains an actual encryption of the witness w ∈ {0, 1}m and real proofs at each
invocation of the PROVE(.) oracle. In the last game, the adversary A is given
an encryption of some random plaintext whereas PROVE(.) returns simulated
zero-knowledge arguments which are generated a simulator P ′ that does not use
any witness. In Game i, Wi stands for the event that the adversary A outputs
the bit b′ = 1.
Game 1: This is the real game, where the challenger feeds A with public param-
eters param containing A¯,U,V ∈ Zn×mq and F ∈ Z2n×nm¯kq . The adversary pro-
duces public keys pkOA = BOA ∈ Zn×m¯q and pkGM = (A, {Ai}`i=0,D0,D1,D,u)
on behalf of the opening authority and the group manager which are both under
its control. The challenger and A run an execution of the JOIN protocol which
allows A to register and certify the public key pkU = BU ∈ Zn×m¯q of some honest
receiver chosen by the challenger. Then, the adversary A makes a polynomial
number of decryption queries which the challenger faithfully handles using the
private key skU = TU ∈ Zm×m¯ for which BU · TU = 0n×m¯. At some point, the
adversary A outputs a triple ((AR,uR),w, L) such that uR = AR · w mod q,
with AR ∈ Zn×mp , uR ∈ Znq and w ∈ {0, 1}m. At this point, the challenger
generates a challenge ciphertext Ψ? = (VK?, c?rec, c
?
oa, Σ
?) consisting of a group
encryption of the real witness w under pkU = BU. Then, the adversary obtains
a polynomial number of proofs pi?Ψ? related to the challenge ciphertext Ψ
? and
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is granted further access to the decryption oracle under the obvious restrictions.
When A halts, it outputs a bit b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
Game 2: In this game, we modify the DEC(.) oracle and have the challenger
reject any ciphertext of the form Ψ = (VK, crec, coa, Σ) such that VK = VK
?
(note that VK? can be generated at the outset of the game w.l.o.g.). Clearly
Game 2 is identical to Game 1 until the event that the challenger rejects a
ciphertext that would not have been rejected in Game 1. This can only occur
if A is able to break the strong unforgeability of the one-time signature OT S.
As in the proof of Theorem 2, we have |Pr[W2]−Pr[W1]| ≤ Advots(λ), which is
negligible if OT S is strongly unforgeable.
Game 3: We now modify the generation of proofs pi?Ψ? . Instead of generating
them using the witnesses used in the generation of Ψ?, we rely on the zero-
knowledge simulator of the argument system of Section 4.2 at each invocation of
PROVEbP,P′ after the challenge phase (note that, since we assume trusted public
parameters, the simulator can use techniques [20] to achieve statistically perfect
simulation without increasing the number of rounds). The statistical ZK property
of the argument system ensures that this change will remain unnoticed, even in
the view of an all powerful adversary: we have |Pr[W3]−Pr[W2]| ∈ negl(λ). From


















are no longer used by the PROVE oracle.
Game 4: In the generation of Ψ?, we set c?rec as an encryption of a random
element of Zmp . Since the random encryption coins s?rec,R?rec,x?rec,y?rec are not used
in Game 3, Lemma 9 gives a simple reduction showing that any significant change
inA’s behavior would imply a selective adversary against the ABB identity-based
encryption scheme. The result of [1] tells us that, under the LWE assumption,
Game 4 is computationally indistinguishable from Game 3 in the adversary’s
view: we have |Pr[W4]− Pr[W3]| ≤ AdvLWE(λ).
Game 5: We bring a last modification to the DEC(.) oracle and now refrain
from applying the rejection rule of Game 2. If OT S is strongly unforgeable, the
distance |Pr[W5]− Pr[W4]| ≤ Advots(λ) must be negligible.
In the last game, the oracle PROVE(.) does not need to know any witness. It
thus mirrors the experiment of Definition 4 where the challenger’s bit is b = 0.
Putting everything altogether, we get |Pr[W5]− Pr[W1]| ∈ negl(λ), which yields
the claimed result. uunionsq
Lemma 9. Any PPT adversary that can distinguish Game 4 from Game 3 im-
plies a selective adversary against the ABB IBE scheme.
Proof. Let us assume a PPT adversary A such that ε = ∣∣Pr[W4] − Pr[W3]∣∣ is
noticeable. We use A to construct a PPT adversary B that breaks the IND-sID-
CPA security of the ABB scheme, which would contradict the LWE assumption,
as established in [1, Th. 23].
At the very beginning of the IND-sID-CPA game, the reduction B generates
a one-time signature key pair (SK?,VK?) and hands VK? to its selective security
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challenger as the target identity under which the challenge ciphertext will later
be computed. In response, B receives the public parameters
PP = (A¯,B,U) ∈ Zn×mq × Zn×m¯q × Zn×mq
from its IBE challenger.
The reduction then runs the missing steps of the actual Setupinit algorithm:
namely, B samples F ← U(Z2m×nm¯kq ),V ← U(Zn×mq ) and generates COMpar
before sending the common public parameters
param =
{
λ, n, q, k,m,B, χ, σ, β, `, κ,OT S,COMpar,FRD, A¯,G,F,U,V
}
to the adversary A.
At this point, the adversary A chooses the public keys pkOA = BOA ∈ Zn×m¯q
and pkGM = (A, {Ai}`i=0,D0,D1,D,u) on behalf of the opening authority and
the group manager. It also starts an execution of the joining protocol in which
the reduction B defines pkU = B ∈ Zn×m¯q as the honest receiver’s public key,
where B ∈ Zn×m¯q is taken from the public parameters PP supplied by its IBE
challenger. Note that pk = B ∈ Zn×m¯q is distributed as a real key in A’s view.
This public key is certified by A which controls the GM.
In the next stage, A makes a number of decryption queries for ciphertexts
of the form Ψ = (VK, crec, cOA, Σ). To answer these, the reduction invokes its
IBE challenger so as to obtain an IBE private key EVK ∈ Z(m+m¯)×m for the
identity VK 6= VK?. The resulting EVK is used it to IBE-decrypt crec and return
the corresponding witness w to A .
At some point, the adversary A queries a challenge ciphertext by outputting
a triple ((AR,uR),w, L) such that w ∈ {0, 1}m satisfies uR = AR · w mod q.
Then, the reduction B requests a challenge ciphertext c?rec to its IBE challenger
by sending it the messages m1 = w ∈ {0, 1}m and m0 ← U({0, 1}m). The
resulting ciphertext c?rec is embedded in Ψ




computing c?OA and Σ
? as in the actual Enc algorithm.
After the challenge phase, A keeps sending decryption queries for ciphertexts
Ψ? containing one-time verification keys VK 6= VK? and these decryption queries
are answered as before. In addition, A is granted access to the stateful oracle
PROVEbP,P′ . Recall that, from Game 3 onwards, all these queries are answered
by returning simulated zero-knowledge arguments. Eventually A outputs a bit
b′ ∈ {0, 1} which is also returned by B to its own challenger.
If the IBE challenger provides a challenge c?rec that encrypts a random mes-
sage (i.e., by encrypting m0), then we are exactly in the setting of Game 4. In
the even that c?rec rather encrypts m1 = w ∈ {0, 1}m, A’s view is exactly the
same as in Game 3. If we denote by Random (resp. Real) the event that the IBE
challenger chooses to encrypt m0 (resp. m1), the advantage of the reduction B
as an IND-sID-CPA adversary is
AdvsID-CPAB (λ) = |Pr[b′ = 1|Real]− Pr[b′ = 1|Random]| = |Pr[W3]− Pr[W4]|
= ε,
which concludes our proof. uunionsq
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